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The new state of Russia has been pursuing a rapprochement with the 
state of Israel since the late 1980's, during the leadership of Mikhail 
Gorbachev. These two states have been continuing the expansion of 
diplomatic and economic relations with one another under Boris Yeltsin. 
The original impetus for this radical change from the previous position of 
having no diplomatic relations was the former Soviet Union's re- 
evaluation of its strategic interests in the Middle East and abroad. Domestic 
and international pressures to re-establish relations were present in the 
Soviet era, but ideological and social taboos, as well as entangling diplomatic 
alliances, prevented  this occurrence. 
The recent and continuing rapprochement between Russia and Israel has 
been facilitated by the change of political leadership in Israel, and makes good 
sense for Russia's struggling economy, strategic interests, and emigration 
concerns. The fall of the Soviet Union has left Russia vulnerable in these 
areas; expanded relations with Israel could provide the means for helping to 
alleviate some of Russia's problems, as well as proving Russia's benevolence 
to the United States, on whom Russia still depends. Russia is also seeking to 
reinforce its status as a world power, and therefore has been actively 
promoting a Middle East peace plan between Israel and the PLO. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The new state of Russia has been pursuing a rapprochement with the 
state of Israel since the late 1980's, during the leadership of Mikhail 
Gorbachev. These two states have been continuing the expansion of 
diplomatic and economic relations with one another under Boris Yeltsin. 
This represents a radical change from past trends in Soviet-Israeli relations, 
which have wavered from supportive, in the era prior to and just after the 
establishment of the state of Israel, to cold in the 1950's and early 1960's, to 
non-existent in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and currently back to 
warm. 
The original impetus for this radical change from the previous 
position of non-existent diplomatic relations was a result of Mikhail 
Gorbachev's glasnost, and the former Soviet Union's re-evaluation of its 
strategic interests in the Middle East and abroad. Domestic and international 
pressures to re-establish relations with Israel were present in the Soviet era, 
but ideological and social taboos, as well as entangling diplomatic alliances, 
prevented this occurrence. A rapprochement with Israel would have run 
counter to Soviet ideology and would not have been acceptable due to 
widespread and government-sponsored anti-Semitism. 
The climate between Israel and the Soviet Union began to improve, as 
demonstrated by an easing in political rhetoric. The most significant 
progress, however, has come after the fall of the USSR. Russia is no longer 
necessarily constrained by time-honored and sometimes fruitless alliances 
with certain Arab countries, and the progress towards peace between Israel 
and the Palestinians has made recognition of Israel easier for Russia to accept 
and still remain true to their traditional allies. 
Russia's new democratic government has also provided the 
opportunity for new people with new ideas to assume positions of power. 
ix 
The emerging closer relationship with Israel has the potential to be greatly 
beneficial to both countries, and, in the opinion of several Russian 
commentators, makes good sense for several reasons. 
First, Russia's economic problems, particularly in the areas of food 
production and distribution, could be partially alleviated by expanded trade 
with Israel. Since "capitalism" is no longer a dirty word, Russia's willingness 
to accept assistance and benefit from Israeli know-how could provide an 
additional stimulus to an economy in need. Israeli innovations in medicine 
and technology could also provide the Russian people an improvement in 
their quality of life. 
Secondly, enormous social pressures exist in Russia today with well 
over a million Jews who remain there, and the population in Israel of 
Russian Jews which is continuing to climb at a tremendous rate. Positive 
diplomatic relations between the two countries would facilitate dealing with 
the issues which will continually arise which will require the cooperation of 
both countries to resolve. Public opinion in Russia has also been gaining 
importance and the media has been portraying Israel in a more positive light 
since the late 1980's. 
Thirdly, there are strategic benefits to be reaped from both sides. A 
friendlier relationship between Russia and Israel has a positive impact on 
Russia's image in the United States, which in turn bolsters U.S.-Russian 
relations. And, as an issue of national pride and a way to maintain credibility 
as a global power (not to mention some vestige of its former superpower 
status) Russia would also like to be seen as a peacemaker in the world arena, 
which would require having relations with Israel in addition to its long- 
standing relations with the Arab countries. 
The rapprochement between Russia and Israel has been caused by a 
combination of domestic and international political developments, and has 
been facilitated by the change of political leadership in Israel. The ongoing 
peace process between Israel and the PLO has enabled Moscow to work 
constructively with both parties while maintaining its integrity by standing 
by the promises of support made to the Palestinians. 
If the Russo-Israeli rapprochement was caused primarily by domestic 
politics, I assert that we should see a significant change in public opinion, 
anti-Semitism, and political rhetoric. Public opinion polls from Russia and 
the CIS show that there is widespread, but not universal, support for closer 
relations with Israel. 
If the rapprochement was primarily caused by the dissolution of the 
USSR and the systemic change was what allowed the establishment of 
relations, I assert that we should see a significant change in governmental 
leadership and a change in ideology. This, in addition to the domestic 
politics assertion, has also occurred to a certain degree. Neither theory proves 
true by itself. International politics remains a key part of this change. 
The fall of the Soviet Union has left Russia vulnerable in many areas; 
Boris Yeltsin has had to come up with a viable plan of action to address 
Russia's many problems. With the end of the Cold War, Russia suddenly 
had numerous options to pursue. One of these was Yeltsin's decision to 
continue Gorbachev's plan of a rapprochement with Israel. It has so far 
proven to be a mutually beneficial venture. 
XI 
I. INTRODUCTION 
April 24,1994 marked a dramatic turning point in relations between 
Russia and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin arrived in Moscow 
for talks with Russia's Prime Minister, Boris Yeltsin, the first visit ever by 
an Israeli Prime Minister to Moscow. 
A decade ago, relations between the two countries did not exist, a 
result of the severing of diplomatic relations in the wake of the 1967 
Middle East war. Since that time, radical changes have shaken the world 
political arena, including the fall of the Communism in Europe, the 
dissolution of the USSR, and a peace accord between the State of Israel 
and the Palestinian people, represented by Yasir Arafat. 
A PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The road ahead is yet unknown; yet the rapprochement in relations 
between Russia and Israel is certainly significant. Why has this change 
happened now and of what is it resultant? Was this change caused 
primarily by Russian domestic politics, or rather by changes in the 
international system resulting from the disintegration of the USSR? 
Furthermore, what are the issues behind this rapprochement and what 
are their implications? It is precisely these questions which I intend to 
address in this thesis. 
First, I shall explore the development of relations between the two 
countries since the founding of the State of Israel in order to place current 
events in their proper historical context. Next I will examine the policy 
changes themselves and what they entail. I will weigh the factors involved 
in change in Russian and Israeli domestic politics, and the way changes in 
bureaucratic structure, public opinion, and political rhetoric all have 
influenced and/or been influenced by events. 
My analysis will then proceed to international events, examining how 
external changes in treaties, alliances, diplomatic visits and trade may 
have affected or have been the result of the Russo-Israeli policy change. 
This dynamic concerns relationships including Egypt, Syria, Iran, Iraq and 
the United States. 
Finally, I will attempt to prove that the rapprochement was caused by 
a combination of both domestic and international factors, plus a bit of 
fortuitous timing. 
The new state of Russia has been pursuing a closer relationship with 
Israel; Israel is also expanding diplomatic and economic relations with 
Russia. Domestic and international pressures to do so were present in the 
Soviet era, but ideological and social taboos, as well as entangling 
diplomatic alliances prevented the establishment of relations. With old 
constraints now removed, Russia is free to reevaluate its interests in the 
Middle East and build a foreign policy more suitable to the present-day 
situation.    , 
In the Soviet period, the USSR's relationship with Israel ranged from 
barely normal to the recent rapprochement. Under Soviet leadership, 
some of the elites were probably aware that positive relations with Israel 
could have been beneficial for their country, but such a move ran counter 
to Soviet ideology and would not have been acceptable due to widespread 
and government-sponsored anti-Semitism. 
It was not until Mikhail Gorbachev and the effects of glasnost that 
things began to change. The climate between Israel and the Soviet Union 
began to improve, as demonstrated by an easing in political rhetoric. The 
most significant progress, however, has come after the fall of the USSR. 
Russia is no longer necessarily constrained by time-honored and fruitless 
alliances with certain Arab countries, and the progress towards peace 
between Israel and the Palestinians has made recognition of Israel easier to 
accept and still remain true to their traditional allies. 
Russia's new democratic government has also provided the 
opportunity for new people with new ideas to assume positions of power. 
The emerging closer relationship with Israel has the potential to be greatly 
beneficial to both countries, and, in the opinion of Russian commentators, 
makes good sense for several reasons. 
First, Russia's economic problems, particularly in the areas of food 
production and distribution, could be partially alleviated by expanded 
trade with Israel. Since "capitalism" is no longer a dirty word, Russia's 
willingness to accept assistance and benefit from Israeli know-how could 
provide an additional stimulus to an economy in need. Israeli innovations 
in medicine and technology could also provide the Russian people an 
improvement in their quality of life. 
Secondly, there exists enormous social pressures in Russia today with 
well over a million Jews who remain there, and the population in Israel 
of Russian Jews which is continuing to climb at a tremendous rate. 
Positive diplomatic relations between the two countries would facilitate 
dealing with the issues which will continually arise which require the 
cooperation of both countries to resolve. Public opinion in Russia has also 
been gaining importance and the media has been portraying Israel in a 
more positive light since the late 1980's. 
Thirdly, there are strategic benefits to be reaped from both sides. A 
friendlier relationship between Russia and Israel has a positive impact on 
Russia's image in the United States, which in turn bolsters U.S.-Russian 
relations. And, as an issue of national pride and a way to maintain 
credibility as a global power (not to mention some vestige of its former 
superpower status) Russia would also like to be seen as peacemaker in 
the world arena, which would require having relations with Israel in 
addition to its long-standing relations with the Arab countries. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
The methodology to be utilized to answer these questions consists of 
answering the following research questions: first, to analyze whether the 
change was caused primarily by domestic politics, I assert that if the 
rapprochement was caused strictly through changes in domestic politics, 
we should see a significant change in public opinion, anti-Semitism, and 
political rhetoric. This will be the dependent variable. 
I will review available public opinion polls from Russia, examining the 
change in political and anti-Semitic attitudes; I will survey the change in 
political rhetoric about one another both in Russia and in Israel, and 
review the status of Russia's alliances in the Middle East and their 
implications. 
Secondly, why did the rapprochement not happen before? This ties us 
into the second question: if the rapprochement was primarily caused by 
the dissolution of the USSR, and the systemic change was what allowed 
the establishment of relations, we should see a significant change in the 
governmental leadership and a change in ideology as well. New faces 
should appear in the policy-making positions and possibly a new 
constitution, etc. I will research how many new people occupy the 
influential positions in the government, and what their political affiliation 
is and was. 
Could it have occurred without the fall of the Soviet Union? Perhaps 
this question ties into the issue of timing. Russia was going through its 
own internal changes even before the fall of the Soviet Union, and 
whereas some of these pressures may well have brought about the demise 
of the Soviet Union, it is impossible to speculate on what would have 
happened if the Union had remained intact. A number of factors going on 
simultaneously in other parts of the world may have had their own impact 
on the change in relations. It is my intent to explore all these avenues and 
determine the factor or combination of factors which are responsible for 
this change. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter will outline the historical background of relations 
between Russia and Israel, in order to give the reader a better 
understanding of recent events from their historical context. 
Relations between the former Soviet Union and the State of Israel have 
wavered between both ends of the spectrum over the course of the 
twentieth century. Understanding the significance of the most recent 
changes in Russo- Israeli relations requires the review of these events in 
light of their historical context. 
A. PRE-STATEHOOD OF ISRAEL 
Russia had, since prior to the turn of the century, a notoriously poor 
record regarding the treatment of its own Jewish citizens, and this anti- 
Jewish attitude, which carried through the Russian Revolution and into 
the Soviet period, was reflected in the initial reactions to the establishment 
of a Zionist organization and their objective: the establishment of a 
national homeland for all the Jews of the world. Zionism was, according to 
the Soviets, a nationalist-bourgeois movement and an instrument of 
British imperial policy. In the years prior to the establishment of the 
Jewish state, Russia still bore the scars of the early pogroms, and the two 
world wars in which so many of her people were lost. However, anti- 
Zionist sentiment was consistently and repeatedly articulated over several 
decades prior to 1947 by Communist ideologists and practical politicians 
alike, and reflected in Soviet domestic policy towards Jews. 
May 14, 1947 marked the first and shocking turning point in Soviet 
policy toward the Zionist movement. In a speech at the United Nations 
General Assembly, Soviet Representative Andrei Gromyko presented a 
famous speech, in which he declared the Soviet Union's willingness to 
support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Speculations 
regarding the reasoning behind this startling declaration include 
Moscow's disappointment with the Arab nationalist movement, which 
'Dagan, Avigdor. Moscow and Terusalem. London: Abelard-Schuman, 1970. 
was pro-German during the war; feelings of anti-Western camaraderie 
and potential alliance with the Jews of Palestine, who were engaged in a 
bitter struggle with the British Mandatory Power2, and the Soviet Union's 
belief that their own strategic interests would be better served supporting 
a Jewish state in the Middle East rather than being at odds with one. There 
was never any serious speculation, however, that Moscow was expressing 
any newly-found pro-Jewish sentiment. "One should never forget, 
however, that basically Soviet policy was dedicated to the social and 
political revolution in the Middle East, and that all Soviet moves, either 
pro-Arab or pro-Jewish, had to be treated as tactics subordinated to this 
major objective."3 
In his book outlining the changing relationship between the two 
countries, Moscow and Terusalem. Avigdor Dagan explains the concerns 
of the Soviet government at that time; Soviet leadership was trying to 
determine the most beneficial strategic position in the Middle East while 
many factors were changing around them. There was great debate over 
who would emerge with the upper hand in settling the post-World War II 
Middle East situation- the countries of the Arab League or the Jews of 
Palestine, struggling for their autonomy. He believes the decisive factors 
which form the basis of the shift in the traditional Soviet position to be the 
Soviets' desire to eliminate Great Britain, the most influential power at that 
time, from the region; the Soviets' pressure towards the West and hopes to 
gain influence in the Mediterranean area; the Soviets' lack of confidence in 
the efficacy and usefulness of the Arab countries in support of their goals; 
and the overestimation of the Jews' readiness to fight, after the 
establishment of the State of Israel, to protect the interests of their new 
state. 
The decision was, therefore, based on a cool calculation of the factors 
that Moscow at that time believed would best further its power interests in 
the region, not on any feelings of sympathy or kinship. Their desire to 
achieve this was so strong that they were able to put aside their traditional 
sentiments to take this step, unprecedented for them. Gromyko qualified 
2Jbid_.,p. 20-21. 
3Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1980. p. 417. 
this statement by explaining that Soviet support of a Jewish state would be 
forthcoming "only if relations between the Jewish and the Arab 
populations of Palestine indeed proved to be so bad that it would be 
impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful coexistence of the 
Arabs and Jews." This clearly acknowledges the lack of any kind of 
patriotic motivation or loyalty to the Jews behind the Soviets' support of 
Israel. 
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL 
In a later speech in November, 1947, Gromyko voiced the Soviet 
Union's support of the United Nations' partition plan for Palestine, 
alienating many Arab leaders. From November and into the following 
year, the Soviets consistently defended the rights of the "Arab and Jewish 
people of Palestine," claiming that the situation was being manipulated by 
the West, notably Great Britain and the United States, to further their own 
territorial and political influence in the region on behalf of their oil 
interests. 
Soviet political rhetoric of that time indicates that the Soviet Union was 
engaged in precisely the same endeavor. Their steadfast support of Israel 
continued through Israel's declaration of statehood in May, 1948, and the 
subsequent attack on Israel by the Arab states who refused to recognize 
Israel's legitimacy. The Soviet Union blamed not only the Arab states 
involved in the fighting, but also Great Britain and her allies, as expressed 
by Vasili Tarassenko, Ukrainian representative to the First Committee on 
May 28,1948, 
It is no exaggeration to say that the United Kingdom 
resolution is designed to stifle the State of Israel and the Jewish 
people in Palestine. The United Kingdom resolution would 
induce the Security Council to adopt a form of nonintervention 
while we have recently heard one of the parties state repeatedly 
that it considers it has an imprescriptible right to carry out 
armed intervention in the internal affairs of Palestine, to destroy 
the state of Israel by force of arms and to bombard the peaceful 
cities of Israel under the pretext of restoring order.4 
4Dagan, Avigdor. p. 31. 
The Soviets also opposed the limits on Jewish immigration to Palestine, 
claiming that it did not constitute a threat to the security of the Arab 
states, infringed upon the rights of the Jewish people, and encroached 
upon the sovereign rights of a state, contrary to the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations.5 
It seems that in 1948 Israel could not have had a better friend than the 
Soviet Union, who defended the interests of the new Jewish state at every 
turn, even to the dismay of certain Arab states with whom the Soviet 
Union was also seeking to improve relations, such as Egypt and Syria. 
Diplomatic missions were established; the Soviets opened theirs in Tel 
Aviv in August, and the Israelis arrived in Moscow to open their mission 
in September, headed by Ms. Golda Myerson, later to be known as Golda 
Meir. Preliminary diplomatic and commercial working sessions were 
successful and promising. There was great excitement in the air among 
Moscow's Jewish community, as Ms. Meir brought up the question of aliya 
of the Soviet Union's Jews at her first meeting with the head of the Foreign 
Ministry's Middle Eastern Department- on September 16, the very same 
day that the first applications for emigration to Israel were received at the 
Legation in Moscow. 
C RELATIONS BEGIN TO SOUR 
Everything seemed to be going well on the official level until the 
publication of a controversial article in Pravda on September 21,1948. This 
notorious article appeared in the immediate wake of the first visit of the 
Israelis to the Moscow synagogue and to the Jewish Theater. This essay, 
to become known as the "Ehrenburg Article," was written by Ilya 
Ehrenburg, a seasoned author of Jewish origin and willing weathervane of 
the regime's changing attitudes. The article condemned Zionists as 
"mystics," and denied that there was any affinity between Jews in various 
Tbid,, p. 31-32. 
countries; it condemned Israel's government as "bourgeois," and 
encouraged Israeli workers to fight against it. 
This event signified an unofficial change in sentiment toward the 
wholeheartedly enthusiastic support for the state of Israel, notifying Soviet 
Jews that support for Israel did not mean that they would be permitted to 
emigrate; the Soviet Jewish question would remain a domestic concern, 
and support for Israel did emphatically not mean support for Zionism. 
Soviet Jews were not to have any contact with Jews outside the Soviet 
Union. Immigration to Israel from any of the Communist countries would 
not be permitted. 
Although formal relations were not affected and remained positive, an 
ill wind borne of a possible misunderstanding began to blow between the 
two countries. This was unanticipated and embarrassing for the Soviets, 
who hoped the Israelis would downplay the kinship between Russia's 
Jews and the Israelis. But the Israelis were not willing to give up so easily. 
Nineteen forty-nine was an eventful year in the establishment of the 
new post-war order. The Marshall Plan was in full swing; NATO was 
being established, as well as the Warsaw Pact. It was at this time that 
Moscow began to have doubts about Israels political loyalty, for as the 
Soviet Union's relationship with the countries of the West became 
increasingly polarized, it also became clear to Moscow that Israel was 
interested in maintaining a close relationship with the United States. The 
Soviets started to become uneasy at the substantial loans Israel was 
receiving from the United States and the friendly relations which that 
entailed. Israel's solution was to reassure Moscow of their loyalty and to 
expand their economic relations with one another. 
On May 5, 1949 Israeli Charge d'Affaires Namir met with Soviet 
Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin. Mr. Zorin went out of his way to sound 
friendly, and assuring Israel of the Soviets' admiration. The Soviet Union 
could be counted on by Israel for whatever assistance and support 
necessary, he explained, provided Israel would continue "on the right 
political line." He did not expound about the exact meaning of this, but 
6Rubin, Ronald. The Unredeemed: Anti-Semitism in thp Soviet Union. Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1968. p. 152. 
7Dagan, Avigdor. p. 36-37. 
Statements both official and unofficial throughout 1949 reflect Moscow's 
expectation that Israel would not begin working on behalf of British or 
American interests, and that the Soviet Union's support depended on 
precisely that. 
The year's high point in Russo-Israeli relations was the conclusion of 
an agreement in August, whereby all former Russian Orthodox properties, 
including churches, convents, and hospices, both in Jerusalem and 
throughout Israel, were taken over by the Soviet government and the 
Soviet-controlled Orthodox Church. 
This arrangement placed Soviet representatives in a strategic 
position in the heart of Jerusalem and delivered into their hands 
the hitherto anti-Communist Orthodox organization in 
Palestine. Russia promptly appointed a member of the Soviet 
Orthodox hierarchy Archbishop of Jerusalem. Israel also 
concluded a number of trade treaties with the Soviet European 
satellites, thus linking to some extent her economy to that of the 
postwar Soviet empire. 
It can be said that the Soviet Union was undergoing a change of line 
from full support to passive neutrality. This can be seen as part of the 
general anti-"cosmopolitan" line, a campaign within the Soviet Union 
which reached its height in the first half of 1949, condemning authors, 
artists and others who "failed to reorient themselves" toward the proper 
Soviet line, a charge which could be interpreted, according to Soviet law, 
as a premeditated crime.9 In fact, the 1950's were characterized by a 
reorientation of Soviet policy toward closer relations with the Arab world. 
The causes of this change were the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and the 
growing conviction that Israel was little more than a satellite of the United 
States.10 The Soviet press echoed this suspicion. Also, the significance of 
the outbreak of war in Korea should not be underestimated, with Israel 
facing off against many Arab countries during United Nations 
proceedings, who condemned North Korea's invasion of the South but 
^enczowski, George, p. 418. 
9Heller, Mikhail and Aleksandr Npkrirh. Utopia in Power: The History of the 
Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present. New York: Summit Books, 1986. p. 564. 
10Ibid.. p. 564. 
10 
insisted that a parallel be drawn between that situation and Israel's 
treatment of the Palestinians. The primary issue of contention between 
Israel and the USSR was that the Soviets backed the North Koreans and 
that Israel insisted on backing the United Nations' plan to intervene for the 
restoration of international security and peace, and refused to condone 
Moscow's withdrawal from the council's vote because of its own 
grievances. Despite later words from Israel which attempted to soften her 
stance, Moscow felt betrayed. 
"Israel's stand on Korea transformed the doubts already existing in the 
minds of the Russians into a certainty that not only could Israel be 
discounted as a potential ally, but that it could not even be relied upon to 
remain neutral in a crisis of vital importance to the Soviet Union."11 This 
explains the cooling of relations between the two countries in 1951, a year 
filled with diplomatic snubs, lack of response to governmental requests, 
and a lack of Soviet support of Israel during United Nations proceedings. 
Israel found itself with increasing frequency on the opposite side of the 
fence from the Soviets on a variety of issues, while the Soviets for the most 
part abstained from voting on any issue which directly concerned Israel. 
Nineteen fifty-three marked a year of political change in Israel, with 
the retirement of David Ben Gurion from active political life. A dedicated 
leader, he emerged "not only as the practically undisputed leader of Israel 
but also as the living symbol of those dynamic values and the assertive 
spirit that characterized modern political Zionism."1 He would return to 
political life two years later, to deal with the enormous growing internal 
challenges within Israeli society, with an increasing influence of the 
Eastern Sephardim over the Western Ashkenazim, plus the clash between 
ultra-orthodox versus the reform, secular and socialist elements, and the 
nationalistic expansionist-minded Herut, versus the more pacifistic and 
moderate social elements. 
Communism could not be disregarded as a problem either. 
The knowledge now available on Communist tactics indicates 
that the party seldom relies on overt activities only and that it 
tends to employ, with increasing success, the method of 
11 Dagan, Avigdor. p. 53. 
12Lenczowski, George, p. 419. 
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infiltration into other organizations. In the Middle East in 
general, the line drawn between the Communists and the 
Socialists has never been as clear as in some of the more 
advanced countries in the West. In Israel this phenomenon 
found its reflection in the existence of the left-wing socialist 
party, the Mapam, which rather consistently showed pro-Soviet 
leanings. Its pronounced leftist tendency in conjunction with a 
pro-Soviet orientation left it open to accusations of dangerous 
closeness to communism.13 
D. RUSSO-ISRAELI RELATIONS ARE SEVERED 
Relations between the two countries were severed in 1953 following 
the explosion of a bomb in the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv. The break 
occurred in conjunction with the anti-Semitic campaign prompted by the 
spurious "Jewish Doctors' Plot", in which several prominent physicians in 
Russia, including Stalin's own personal physician, were arrested on 
trumped-up charges and, after "confessing" their guilt (extracted by means 
of torture) of plotting to murder members of the Party elite by giving 
improper medical treatment, were sentenced to death. The event raised 
the awareness and indignation of much of the free world. After Stalin's 
death and the exposure of the bogus conspiracy, relations between the 
USSR and Israel were [quickly] restored.14 
Meanwhile, the Soviets were cultivating their Arab alliances. In 1953 
the Soviets began pursuing a closer relationship with Syria and Egypt, 
which was proven during the Suez Canal conflict, in which Great Britain, 
France, and Israel attacked Egypt in response to the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal. Due to the intervention of the United States and the United 
Nations in the settlement after this war, Israel and Egypt never got a 
chance to come to a peace agreement with one another. The Soviet- 
Egyptian friendship would last through the sixties under the leadership of 
Gamal Abd-el Nasser, and into the seventies, abruptly terminated by 
Anwar Sadat in 1972 by the expulsion of the entire Soviet military mission; 
the Syrian alliance, however, would last much longer. 
13 Ibid.. p.420. 
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If one were to follow the Arab proverb that "the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend," then the Israelis could certainly have interpreted the Soviets' 
blossoming friendship with Egypt as a menace to its own relationship 
with the Soviet Union (despite the propaganda to the contrary) not to 
mention to Israel's national security, with such a superpower now backing 
one's avowed enemy. 
In July 1955 Shepilov, editor-in-Chief of Pravda and a future 
secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was sent to Egypt. 
From that moment, Soviet expansion in the Middle East 
increased. Egyptian President Nasser needed arms, which he 
soon began to receive from a Soviet satellite- Czechoslovakia. 
Later, the Soviet Union began supplying Egypt directly with 
tanks and aircraft, MIG fighters, for example, as well as artillery 
systems. 
This closeness between Soviet-Egyptian relations was coupled with an 
identifiable coldness between Israel and the Soviet Union. This new Soviet 
attitude found full expression in a speech delivered by Communist Party 
Secretary Nikita Khrushchev on December 29,1955, stating "that from the 
first day of its existence, the State of Israel has been taking a hostile, 
threatening position toward its neighbors. Imperialists are behind Israel, 
trying to exploit it against the Arabs for their own benefit." 
1. The Suez War of 1956 
Nineteen fifty-six, however, was a year that put everyone's loyalties to 
the test. The events surrounding the outbreak of the Suez War involved 
not only Egypt and Israel, but the United States, the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain and France. On July 19,1956 the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, declared that the Egyptian economy was bankrupt and that the 
United States, Great Britain and the International Bank were therefore 
withdrawing their offer to finance the construction of the Aswan High 
Dam. The new Soviet Foreign Minister Dimitri Shepilov, having recently 
replaced Molotov, traveled to Egypt to participate in the 26th of July 
15Heller & Nekrich, p. 564. 
16Lenczowski, George. 427. 
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Revolution celebrations. In a meeting with Gamal Abd-el Nasser, he 
declared that the Soviet Union would be willing to carry out the Aswan 
High Dam project. Feeling empowered by the good news, Nasser made a 
bold move in retaliation for the withdrawal of support from the U.S. and 
Great Britain- he declared the Suez Canal nationalized.17 
This proclamation precipitated a flurry of events. The British and the 
French, each owners of 50% of the Suez Canal Company, called several 
secret meetings which included Israel. While these three countries invited 
Egypt to come and attend an international conference on the issue in 
London, they were simultaneously gearing up for an attack on Egypt, 
which was launched in the Sinai on October 29, 1956. Nasser, having 
rejected the British/French ultimatum to rescind their action, fought on 
and suffered heavy losses. Nasser asked President Eisenhower via the U.S. 
ambassador to "deal with" its allies, while Egypt would take care of Israel. 
When the Soviet Union learned that Britain and France had 
responded to the U.S. President's request, it addressed a 
warning- known as the Khrushchev-Bulganin Ultimatum-to 
both countries. It was nothing in effect but an exercise in 
muscle-flexing and an attempt to appear as though the Soviet 
Union had saved the situation. This was not, of course, the case. 
It was Eisenhower who did so. Both Britain and France obeyed 
his orders and withdrew their forces by December 23. Israel 
18 followed suit. 
President Nasser missed a golden opportunity in the wake of the 1956 
tripartite aggression, however; instead of recognizing Egypt's victory as a 
result of Eisenhower's intervention, he attributed the victory to the Soviet 
warning, praising their efforts to the disregard of Eisenhower's role. 
"Nasser should have seized the chance to consolidate U.S.-Egyptian 
relations, if only to frustrate the Israeli strategy which sought the 
reverse." 
The Suez conflict of 1956 provided a massive distraction from Soviet 
activities on another front, the Soviet invasion into Hungary. While 
17Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. p. 142. 
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popular support in Moscow was very vocal on behalf of Egypt, there was 
no such demonstration on Hungary's behalf. 
The years after Stalin's death and into the 1960's were years of normal 
relations between the Soviet Union and Israel, but they can hardly be 
described as friendly. Characterized by a growing closeness with the Arab 
states, the Soviets exhibited a growing antagonism with those states 
considered to be overly supportive of the West, including Turkey. Israel 
was not often mentioned by name, but the implications were perfectly 
clear. The relationship had deteriorated due to the Soviet Union's 
reprioritization of strategic interests in the Middle East. 
At the same time that these "normal" relations were in place, Israel was 
constantly at odds with its Arab neighbors. Incidents of "infiltration" into 
Israeli territory by neighboring Arabs were responded to with harsh 
government-sponsored retaliation, which fueled further conflict. This 
involved reprisals not only against the Palestinians who resided along the 
border in the refugee camps and sought passage back and forth from jobs 
or family, but also Egyptians, Syrians, and Lebanese. Indiscriminate 
retaliatory killing of civilians was, unfortunately, commonplace on both 
sides. 
2. The Six Day War of 1967 
The Six Day War of 1967 was a preventive strike launched by Israel in 
response to Egypt's removal of United Nations forces stationed along her 
border with Israel, and the subsequent declaration by Gamal Abd-el 
Nasser of the intention to blockade the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. 
In the Israeli view, these actions were unprovoked, an affront to their 
sovereignty, and a threat to the people of Israel. The government of Israel 
therefore implored the Soviet Union for support; a note was delivered 
from Prime Minister Eshkol to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
Kosygin, to that affect. The Soviet reply placed full responsibility for the 
war on Israel's shoulders, stating that Israel acted first in the perpetration 
of aggression against its Arab neighbors, and would have to live with the 
consequences. 
The clumsy attack was a military fiasco for Egypt, Syria, Jordan and 
Iraq, whose forces were completely neutralized in only six days. The war 
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opened a new chapter in the history of official Soviet anti-Semitism, 
however. 
E POST SIX DAY WAR TO GLASNOST 
After the war, the authorities ceased to disguise official anti-Semitism, 
and it acquired full rights. "Zionism became the latest approved scapegoat 
and authorized object of hatred, just in the way Nepmen, wreckers, and 
kulaks had been. In books and periodicals, published in millions of copies, 
and in movies and television broadcasts, Zionism was depicted as a most 
serious threat to the Soviet state."20 This idea persisted throughout the 
seventies and rendered life quite unpleasant for the Soviet Union's own 
Jews, and especially for the Jewish refuseniks, those who had requested 
permission from the government to emigrate and were denied permission 
to do so. These people became "tainted"; they were scorned by others, and 
often lost privileges they had had, such as nice jobs or apartments. Their 
actions were interpreted by the propaganda machine as proof of their 
subversive intentions and lack of loyalty to the state, 
The 'struggle against Zionism' is an outstanding example of 
the omnipotence of Soviet ideology. With the aid of quotations 
from Marx and Lenin, anti-Zionism is presented as a form of 
class struggle. Soviet ideologists have added a new chapter to 
Lenin's theory of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism: 
Zionism as the last stage of imperialism. Within the USSR anti- 
Zionism is used to mobilize the country's peoples against a 
common enemy: the Jews. One of the greatest victories of Soviet 
ideology during the 1970's was the United Nations' resolution 
pronouncing Zionism to be a form of racism. 
Hindsight allows us to see exactly how truth can be so subjective. The 
Soviets were quite accustomed to practicing their own interpretation of 
fact. The mutual diplomatic insults which followed came as little surprise, 
and resulted finally in the following message, delivered to Israeli 
Ambassador Katz on June 10,1967 at the Soviet Foreign Ministry: 
2 !0Heller & Nekrich, p. 670. 
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The Government of the Soviet Union announces that, in 
view of the continued aggression by Israel against Arab states in 
flagrant violation of the Security Council decision, the 
Government of the Soviet Union has decided to break off 
diplomatic relations with Israel.22 
The Israelis counter-accused the Soviets of basing their decisions on 
Arab propaganda, rather than fact, but accepted the break of relations. 
In the end, Moscow completely identified its interests in the Middle 
East with those of Egypt and Syria," and by a tactical use of the instability 
in the area and the existence of the Arab-Israeli tension to reduce these 
Arab countries to an even larger measure of dependence on the Soviet 
Union."23 The Soviets were extremely upset over the tremendous losses 
suffered by Egypt, particularly after having supplied them with massive 
amounts of money, military advisers, and arms. They were justifiably 
concerned about the resulting attitude of the Arab peoples regarding the 
USSR, who felt that they were abandoned by their protector in their hour 
of need. 
The severance of diplomatic relations was, therefore, both an 
act of wrath and an attempt to prove to the Arabs that the Soviet 
Union was fully behind them and was working for their good. 
The replenishment of the Egyptian arsenal, the continuation of 
badly needed economic assistance to the Arab countries, and the 
sending of the Red fleet into the Mediterranean Sea were the 
further proof. They were also steps taken to keep the Middle 
East in the ferment of tension necessary to further Soviet aims in 
the area. 
The Soviet Union's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Israel 
was a based on a strange logic; if the Soviets' strategic goal was to wield 
influence in the Middle Eastern political arena, they had just cut 
themselves off from a great opportunity. The Soviet Union had already 
invested a great deal economically, politically, and militarily in the Arab 
countries, yet their payback was minimal in terms of loyalty or political 
22Dagan, Avigdor. p. 236. 
23Ibid.. p. 239. 
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influence. Severing relations with Israel also left the door wide open for 
the United States' relationship with Israel to develop. In addition, the 
Soviets quickly discovered that it was next to impossible to bring any 
influence to bear on Israel and that they had more or less debarred 
themselves from participation in the deliberations for any kind of peaceful 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the Soviets would 
thereafter find it next to impossible to restore relations with Israel without 
giving the undesirable impression that a major ideological change had 
taken place in their foreign policy, should their perceived interests shift 
back toward Israel in the future.25 
It came as no great surprise when the situation between Israel and 
Egypt began to heat up again. By the spring of 1970 the Egyptians were 
nearing desperation at the porous condition of their defenses in the 
escalating War of Attrition which they had initiated against Israel from 
1968-1970. 
In response, the Soviets escalated their own commitment by 
installing surface-to-air missiles (SAM-3) sites, manned by 
Soviet 'advisors', and providing Soviet pilots to fly Egypt's MIG- 
21 interceptors in combat missions against the Israeli Phantom 
jets. At this point, there were approximately 20,000 Soviet 
military personnel stationed in Egypt, and the size of the 
Mediterranean naval squadron had been increased as well. 
Clearly the Russians felt that they could not afford to have their 
clients humiliated, but they also feared that further escalation of 
the conflict might soon involve them in a direct confrontation 
with the United States. To avoid this outcome, once the 
defensive installations were in place, Moscow acquiesced in the 
American drive for a cease-fire in the War of Attrition; this was 
achieved in August 1970.26 
The Soviets' break with Israel was probably what ultimately doomed 
their relations with Egypt as well. In September, 1970 the government in 
Egypt had just changed hands after the death of Nasser. The new 
President, Anwar Sadat, badly needed a victory in the continuing conflict 
3Laquer, Walter. Foreward to Soviet Policy Toward Israel Under Gorbarhpv by 
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with Israel in order to bring stability to the government and galvanize the 
support of the Egyptian people. Since the Soviets no longer had any 
influence or any contacts in Israel, Egypt turned to the United States for an 
interim solution to the conflict. This marked the beginning of increasing 
American involvement on the Egyptian side of the conflict and a more 
neutral position for Egypt vis-a-vis the two superpowers. 
1. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 
Throughout the mid and late seventies the Middle East was seen by 
the world's superpowers as a potential fuse for a nuclear confrontation. 
The October 1973 (Yom Kippur) War between Israel and the combined 
forces of Egypt and Syria was felt to be a powder keg which could have 
inflicted much more serious damage than the resulting five-month oil 
embargo against the United States. Despite all the military aid given to 
Egypt by the Soviet Union during the October War, Egypt was drifting 
more toward the United States, to the chagrin of the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet leaders, therefore, may have had some reservations about the 
desirability of sacrificing detente for the sake of a rather fickle Arab ally. 
In his autobiography, Tn Search of Identity, the late President of Egypt, 
Anwar Sadat recounts how the Soviets attempted to trick him into 
accepting a cease-fire after only six and a half hours of fighting, claiming 
that President Assad of Syria had requested it in a meeting with Soviet 
leadership. The request was verified by secret message from Sadat to 
Assad, who denied the entire story. 
"It was only after three days of fighting, when it appeared that the 
Arab side was in fact winning, that the Russians, perhaps sensing the 
possibility of finally being able to rally the Arabs into the long-advocated 
'anti-imperialist' alignment and strike a blow at U.S. interests in the 
Middle East, moved to increase their involvement in the war, yet at the 
27 
same time keeping their involvement within limited bounds." 
Since formal relations between Israel and the USSR did not exist 
during these years, it was via Egypt that the Soviets were able to attempt 
27Freedman, Rnhprt. Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970. New York: 
Praeger, 1982. p. 145. 
19 
to exert their influence in the area. Egypt, however, did not cooperate; 
President Sadat terminated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
between the two countries in March, 1976. "Sadat had increasingly aligned 
himself with anti-Soviet forces in the Middle East, even going so far as to 
approach the Israelis directly in order to freeze the Soviets out of the 
region. That, presumably, was one of the reasons for Sadat's dramatic visit 
to Jerusalem in November, 1977."28 This event signified the utter 
bankruptcy of Moscow's Egyptian policy. This was a source of bitter 
frustration for Moscow, as it realized that it had shut itself off from Israel 
in order to cultivate its relations with the Arab countries, who apparently 
felt neither gratitude nor obligation to maintain close ties with them. 
2. The Camp David Accords 
The Soviets responded to the Camp David Accords by reinforcing their 
alliance with Ethiopia, the only remaining country in the Red Sea area 
with whom they still had good relations. In addition, the Soviets also 
made one of its periodic gestures to Israel, by inviting a delegation of 
Israeli parliamentarians from a variety of parties to Moscow for 
discussions with the Soviet Peace Committee. "In many ways reminiscent 
of the dispatch of Soviet representatives to Israel at the time of the United 
States Middle East policy 'reappraisal' in 1975 and Gromyko's private talk 
with Abba Eban in 1973, it seemed to be a Soviet effort, at a turning point 
in Middle Eastern affairs, to try to gain Israeli support for the Soviet 
Middle East peace plan."29 Moscow was trying to placate all sides as it 
watched its position in the Middle East falling apart. 
These steps, however, did not indicate a change in Moscow's formal 
relations with Israel, referring to Israel in the Soviet press in January, 1980 
as the "Zionist Entity." In fact, the Soviets would use the numerous 
condemnations of Israel by the U.N. in the spring and summer of 1980, 
condemnations which were initiated by Moscow's Arab allies and to 
which they added their own sharp invectives, to attempt to divert 
attention away from Afghanistan where, despite a massive troop 
28Nogee & Donaldson, p. 283. 
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commitment, the USSR was facing serious difficulties in suppressing the 
rebels.30 
Nevertheless, the Brezhnev government in 1981 reiterated its desire for 
the Soviet Middle East peace plan to be implemented, which would place 
the Soviet Union center stage as the diplomatic mediator. Interestingly 
enough, their plan did recognize Israel and its security needs, in addition 
to their traditional support for the Palestinians. 
F. GLASNOST AND BEYOND 
In the early 1980's, the years when the Cold War raged, the Soviet 
Union drastically reduced the number of Jews it allowed to emigrate. 
"During the 1970's, the Soviet leadership, primarily for the purpose of 
improving U.S.-USSR relations, allowed more than 220,000 Jews to 
emigrate. Initially, the vast majority came to Israel. By the mid-1970's, 
most Soviet Jewish Emigres were going to the United States, a 
development that led to a sharp clash between Israeli and U.S. Jewish 
leaders." 
Gorbachev's perestroika presented the first opportunity in many years 
for relations between Israel and the USSR to warm. In this context, 
Gorbachev decided to initiate a rapprochement with Israel as part of a 
plan to improve relations with and lessen the threat from the United 
States. In his new thinking, (Marxist-Leninist) ideology played a less 
important role in dictating foreign policy, and the Soviet press was freer 
under glasnost to report objectively on both sides of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
The beginning of the rapprochement which occurred in 1985-86 was 
centered around two key issues: the re-establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Israel, and an increase in the number of Soviet Jews 
permitted to leave the USSR. These gestures took place despite recent 
Israeli actions that bound the Jewish state even more tightly to the United 
States- for example, Israel's signing of strategic cooperation and free trade 
3 
'°Ibid.. p. 351. 
31Freedman, Robert. Soviet Policy Toward Israel Under Gorbachev. New York: 
Praeger, 1991. 
21 
agreements with the United States and its agreement to enter into the U.S. 
Star Wars defense scheme, plus to allow the construction of a Voice of 
America transmitter on Israeli territory.32 
During talks in August 1985 between the Israeli and Soviet 
ambassadors to France, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to 
consider the re-establishment of relations with Israel if the Israelis would 
enter into negotiations with Syria regarding a peaceful settlement of the 
Golan Heights dispute. The Soviets also expressed greater flexibility 
regarding the issue of Jewish Emigres; the problem of Jewish emigration 
could be solved in return for an end to the anti-Soviet propaganda which 
they claimed was being conducted by Israel in the West. They would 
permit the Jews to leave if they were guaranteed that the Jews would 
emigrate to Israel, not to the United States, for they feared a brain drain to 
the West. The Soviet Union confirmed support for Israel's right to exist, 
and expressed concern over the freeze in the peace process. 
These were the reports made public in the West; the Arab world heard 
a repetition of the Soviets' old position: no recognition without the return 
of the territory seized in 1967.33 
Much of the progress toward the re-establishment of relations stalled 
as a result of the escalation in terrorism in the Middle East in 1985-87. 
There was renewed anger from the Israelis in response to actions by 
terrorist groups associated with the Palestinian cause, and Israel's 
reluctance to enter into any kind of peace negotiations with them therefore 
increased. As the prospects for a peace agreement dimmed, so did the 
prospects for renewed Soviet-Israeli relations. The government of Shimon 
Peres took a particularly rigid stance on any concessions which may have 
helped the process. By the end of 1986 and beginning of 1987, however, 
Yitzhak Shamir became the Prime Minister and Peres the Foreign 
Minister, in accordance with the Israeli government's rotation agreement. 
In early 1987 Shimon Peres began actively working to bring about an 
international peace conference. 
'When he assumed the post of foreign minister in October 1986 
(after stepping down as prime minister under the government's 
32 rbid.. p. 14. 
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rotation agreement), Peres began to call for an international 
conference, which he believed would precipitate new Israeli 
elections and regain him the post of prime minister... Partly to 
deflect this pressure, Prime Minister Shamir traveled to the 
United States in mid-February, where he branded the idea of an 
international peace conference a 'Soviet-inspired notion 
supported by radical Arabs.'" 
In early 1987 the United States' solid relations in the Middle East were 
rocked by the Iran-Contra scandal. Moscow seized this opportunity to 
begin sending clear signals to Israel regarding the re-establishment of 
relations and to press for a peace conference in which the Soviets could 
play a central role. Gorbachev seized this opportunity to support Shimon 
Peres in his talks on behalf of a peace conference with Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak and members of the European Community. Mutual 
exchanges of non-diplomatic delegations occurred, and the subsequent 
media reporting was much less critical than in previous years. 
Nevertheless, huge debates grew in Israel and the United States over the 
terms of any possible re-establishment of relations. Most people seemed to 
be in favor of the rapprochement in principle, but there were too many 
emotional issues involved which made people wary of being overly 
confident too soon. 
In January 1987 the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated that the resumption 
of Soviet-Israeli relations would be possible within the process of a Middle 
East settlement.35 Over the course of the year talks continued. In 
December, 1987, the Intifada (Palestinian Uprising) began, throwing the 
region into turmoil once again. High-level meetings took place between 
George Schultz and a line of Middle Eastern leaders, Gorbachev and 
Arafat, and Shevardnadze and Shamir. Gorbachev had to walk a fine line 
between Arafat and Shamir, to say just the right things to keep both 
leaders willing to cooperate and not offend one party by being too 
sympathetic to the other. 
Meanwhile, Moscow was benefiting from a number of developments 
in the Middle East which seemed to improve the Soviet Union's position 
among the Arabs.  First, since Moscow had declared that it was pulling its 
34Ibicl.,p.31. 
35Ibid.. p. 44. 
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troops out of Afghanistan, there was far less of a perceived Soviet "threat" 
among the Arabs; secondly, a number of intra-Arab disputes which had 
plagued Soviet policy were finally being settled, which was also helping to 
stabilize the region, including Ethiopia & Somalia, Algeria & Morocco, 
Libya & Chad and Libya & Tunisia. Moscow considered cooperation 
among these North African states to be important to keep in check the 
often unpredictable behavior of Qaddafi in Libya. And lastly, Moscow's 
greatly improved relations with Egypt, which included a new agreement 
on economic cooperation.36 
G. RELATIONS ARE RE-ESTABLISHED 
Throughout 1989 and 1990, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and 
humanitarian gestures increased greatly, and talks between the two 
countries continued, as the quest for a Middle East peace progressed. 
Meanwhile, Hungary re-established relations with Israel, and many 
people both inside and outside the government were calling for the same 
move for the USSR. The United States began limiting the number of 
Jewish immigrants it would accept as refugees, a long-standing Soviet 
request. 
In the final four months of the USSR's existence, following the abortive 
coup d'etat in August, 1991, the greatest strides were taken in improving 
Soviet-Israeli relations. As the Union split apart, Israel strove to maintain 
the improving relations with Russia that it had had with the Soviet Union. 
Moscow finally voted to repeal the United Nations policy of "Zionism is 
Racism." Direct airline services were established from Moscow and St. 
Petersburg to Tel Aviv to facilitate emigration of Russian Jews following 
an agreement between Aeroflot and El Al. Full diplomatic relations were 
re-established on October 18, 1991, two weeks before the Middle East 
peace conference which convened in Madrid. 
The road since that time has not been without its obstacles; Russia and 
the newly independent states all have a myriad of problems to face. But 
36Ibid.. p. 54. 
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despite the challenges, historic steps are being made. On April 24,1994, 
Yitzhak Rabin arrived in Moscow, for the first visit ever of an Israeli Prime 
Minister to Russia. The signs continue to be positive for the continuance of 
improving relations between the two very influential countries. 
25 
26 
III. DOMESTIC POLITICS ANALYSIS 
This chapter will discuss the various internal political factors, first in 
Russia, and then in Israel, which affected the rapprochement between the 
two countries. Each section will be broken down into the relevant issues 
which affected each country, with a brief look at the development of each 
specific issue. 
A RUSSIA 
1. Political Situation 
The government of Boris Yeltsin finds itself today in a quite different 
situation than did the government of several years earlier. Eager to 
maintain its image as a world power and simultaneously feed its people, 
Russia's leadership has had to find the delicate balance of winning the 
approval of the West in order to continue receiving vital economic aid, 
while at the same time maintaining the support of the majority of its own 
government, to include members of the right wing. 
In the pre-Gorbachev era, relations between the Soviet Union and 
Israel were based on the maintenance of hostility, which in turn furthered 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such a situation "enhanced the importance of the 
Soviet Union as an arms supplier and a source of diplomatic support to 
the Arabs and further strengthened its position in the Middle East." The 
two countries were continually at odds with one another due to the 
USSR's close ties with Israel's enemies, namely Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and the 
PLO. Although Israel repeatedly called upon the Soviet Union to re- 
establish diplomatic relations, the Soviets insisted that no such 
relationship would be established unless the Israelis withdrew all of their 
forces from the territory seized in the 1967 war. The issue of Soviet Jewry 
was also a wedge which continued to separate the two countries. 
In deciding upon a strategy for the Middle East, Moscow had to deal 
with some formidable challenges. The situation was particularly 
complicated because of the numerous inter-Arab and regional conflicts, 
38Freedman, Robert, Soviet Policy(Gorbachev), P- 5. 
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which usually meant that when the Soviets favored one party, it would 
alienate another. Second, local communist parties tended to damage 
relations between the USSR and that state, as the interests of Moscow and 
the state in question inevitably diverged. Third, the bond of economic 
dependence between the Arab countries and the USSR was weakened by 
the oil wealth which flowed in after the increase in oil prices in 1973-74. 
Fourth, the resurgence of Islam put Moscow, with their policy of official 
atheism, at a distinct disadvantage in the highly religious Middle East, 
especially after their invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. Fifth, since the USSR 
had no relations with Israel, the United States was the only superpower 
able to address both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and thus gained a 
competitive edge as the world's peacemaker. Finally, the United States, 
France, and to a lesser extent China all opposed Moscow's attempts to 
predominate in the region, which often enabled the Middle Eastern states 
to play the great powers off against one another so that no one would 
39 have dominance. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russo-Israeli relations look quite 
different. Exactly what changes have taken place and why did they 
happen? 
Gorbachev had to decide on a new course of action to suit the changing 
world. In his book, Soviet Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev. Robert O. 
Freedman outlines four major factors responsible for the improvement in 
Russo-Israeli relations during Gorbachev's tenure in office: first was the 
Middle Eastern political situation; Moscow sought, of course, to maximize 
its own political position in the region, and Gorbachev felt that 
participation in a peace conference which would bring about the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be the best way to accomplish 
this. He realized that establishing a dialogue with Israel would be 
necessary in order to coax the Israelis to the bargaining table. The political 
scenario was further complicated by the break between King Hussein of 
Jordan and Yasir Arafat, in addition to the rise in terrorism at that time. 
Second, Gorbachev sought to influence public opinion in the United 
States. With his major economic and political reforms underway, 
"Gorbachev clearly wanted to slow down the arms race to free resources 
39Ibid- p. 3-4. 
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for the lagging Soviet economy." Gorbachev therefore surmised that 
establishing positive relations with Israel would improve the Soviets' 
image in the United States and make them appear less of a threat; this 
would precipitate arms control benefits as well as possible trade benefits. 
Third, there were possible trade benefits to be reaped from direct Soviet- 
Israeli trade, which could provide a means whereby some shortages could 
be alleviated. Israeli technology in agriculture would be of particular use 
to the Central Asian republics, who had the potential to be of great value 
to the Soviet food supply. Finally, the impact of Soviet public opinion was 
becoming a factor in the formation of foreign policy, if only a minor one. 
Although a great deal of anti-Semitism still existed at the level of the man- 
in-the-street, Soviet citizens in general were beginning to acquire a more 
positive view of Israel as a result of Israel's assistance to the USSR on 
several humanitarian missions.40 
The first precursor of change in relations was the major policy change 
of glasnost under Mikhail Gorbachev; this new thinking allowed a freedom 
of the press, to report objectively- which set the stage for attacking one of 
the roots of the poor relations between Russia and Israel, traditional anti- 
Semitism. 
2. Anti-Semitism 
No one denies the institutionalized anti-Semitism which existed in the 
Soviet Union. Popular attitudes have also changed in accordance with the 
intensity of the campaigns of any given government- from Stalin's ferocity 
to Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's tolerance. There are several possible 
explanations for these "propaganda zigzags."41 First, the propaganda may 
have had different goals for different audiences. American Jews would 
have heard one message, while third-world states another; these 
campaigns would also play out very differently in the various republics of 
the USSR, where the different levels of anti-Semitism could explain the 
Ibid.. p. xv-xvi. 
41Drachman, Edward. Challenging the Kremlin: The Sovipt Tewish Mnvpmpnt fnr 
Freedom. 1967-1990 New York: Paragon House, 1992. p. 102. 
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intensity of the articles published there. Secondly, there may have been 
disagreement within the Soviet leadership itself over the Jewish Question. 
Thus at times, such as in the early 1970's, the Kremlin 
published its approval of emigration for reunification to 
enhance chances that detente would succeed. But at other times, 
such as the 1980's, it announced emigration was virtually over 
because it felt that too many Jews were leaving, a more 
liberalized emigration policy had not won them the diplomatic 
gains they had sought and dissident activities had grown too 
strong and potentially dangerous.42 
A third explanation is that the Soviets wanted to hedge on anti- 
Semitism, with the division of propagandists into hard-liners and soft- 
liners, the latter being just as damaging due to the subtlety of their attacks. 
Finally, it is possible that Soviet thinking had truly gone through a change 
under glasnost, signaling the rejection of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist 
propaganda; this propaganda could no longer be successfully 
promulgated as the propaganda machine disintegrated under glasnost. 
Although the overall trend in the expression of anti-Semitism in the 
post-Soviet era has been decreasing, there have been backslides since the 
beginning of the rapprochement, notably after the rise to prominence of 
the ultra nationalist right-wing leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky in June, 1991. 
However, since the beginning of glasnost, several distinct changes became 
evident in the Soviet press. More Jewish names began to appear as writers 
in the Soviet media, rather than using Russian-sounding pseudonyms. 
More items also appeared in the media of Jewish interest. On March 11, 
1987, Literaturnaya Gazeta published a story about the Jewish Studio 
Theater in Moscow, written by Nina Yelekhova. "Soviet citizens should 
not be isolated from one another," argued the author, "by the section of 
their internal passport that designates nationality." This was quite a 
breakthrough, as the Kremlin had never before admitted publicly that the 
nationality line on the passport had ever before caused divisiveness.43 
^Ibid.. p. 102-103. 
43MLp.l03. 
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3. Political Rhetoric 
The beginning manifestations of this change, the change in the press 
coverage of Israel, was followed by unofficial talks between Soviet and 
Israeli representatives at locations abroad. At a meeting in Paris, the Israeli 
Ambassador to France, Ovadia Sofer met with his Soviet counterpart, Yuli 
Vorontsov in July, 1985. They tentatively discussed the necessary 
preconditions for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, to include a 
partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and a liberal Soviet 
policy for the emigration of Soviet Jews wishing to leave. Ambassador 
Sofer then requested that a meeting be held between Vice Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir and his new Soviet counterpart. The content of this private 
meeting was leaked to the Israeli press, and caused a great deal of anger in 
the Arab world, especially in Syria.44 
There was a recognizable change in the political rhetoric in the Soviet 
Union; articles also began to appear in the Soviet press which portrayed 
Israel in a favorable light. This change was first demonstrated in 1987 and 
generally continued through 1990. When disaster struck the Soviet Union 
in the form of a major train accident on the Trans-Siberian railway, Israel 
offered medical assistance for the burn victims of the crash, and a team of 
Israeli doctors, together with specially developed medications and 
synthetic skin, was sent to Moscow. Upon their return home, Georgy 
Martirosov, head of the Soviet Consulate in Israel, praised the efforts of 
the doctors, claiming that they had not only saved lives but helped foster 
an atmosphere of positive relations between the two countries. A similar 
incident of humanitarian assistance occurred in the wake of the 
devastating Armenian earthquake of 1988. Sixty-one people were flown 
to Israel for specialized treatment on the first El Al plane ever to make a 
flight to the USSR. Both of these events were covered by the Soviet press, 
which praised Israel and planted the seeds in the public consciousness of 
the possibility of a friendly relationship between the two countries. 
There was also a substantial drop in the volume of anti-Semitic and 
anti-Zionist propaganda in the media. "Certain publications like Nedelya, 
44 Ibid, p. 17. 
45Freedman, Robert. Soviet Policy(Gorbachev). p. 75. 
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the weekly supplement to Izvestia, began to criticize anti-Semitism in the 
USSR. Until then these publications had regularly printed anti-Semitic 
diatribes. The major newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, also began to oppose 
anti-Semitism in 1987. At the same time, however, anti-Semitic articles 
increased in frequency and intensity in some local newspapers, such as 
Leningradskaya Pravda.."46 Anti-Semitism came to be associated with anti- 
reform political forces and their mass media outlets. 
The media was reflecting the general change in tenor in government 
policy. 
Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict moved from an 
uncritical embrace of radical Arab positions to a much more 
even-handed view, eventually not that different from the 
position of the European Community and even the United 
States: support for Israel's existence within secure and 
recognized borders, resolution of the territorial issue on the 
basis of direct talks between Israel and the Arab states, 
opposition to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and 
a solution to the Palestinian question on the basis of Palestinian 
self-determination.47 
In conjunction with the decline of Israel-bashing in the Soviet press, 
came its complement- articles of greater objectivity, which did not always 
portray the Arab countries as guilt-free. Equal responsibility for finding a 
solution to the quest for peace was placed on the Arab countries, instead 
of merely dwelling on the "injustices" imposed upon them by Israel. An 
Izvestia article of December 30,1988, for example, criticized a meeting of 
Islamic fundamentalists who were planning to wage a jihad (holy war) 
against Israel and the Damascus-based PLO factions that were trying to 
undermine Arafat's leadership in the PLO.48 
46Drachman, Edward, p. 104. 
Avineri, Shlomo. "Israel and the End of the Cold War: the Shadow has Faded," 
Brookings Review. Spring 1993, vol. 11, n2. 
4Treedman, Robert. Soviet Policy(Gorbachev), p. 65. 
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4. Diplomacy 
Diplomatic talks continued during the years in between, 1986-87, by 
various representatives of the two countries. The USSR, while giving 
certain indications of the desire for a rapprochement, continued to 
condemn Israel on many fronts. These clashes continued between the two 
countries on a state-to-state level; however, beneath the surface there was 
a great improvement in Israeli-Soviet ties in areas such as cultural, 
religious, and humanitarian relations. 1988-89 marked the beginning of 
the blossoming of cultural relations, despite the difficulties endured with 
establishing relations at the national level. 
In addition to humanitarian assistance, sub-governmental 
relations of all types blossomed in the spring and summer of 
1989. For the first time since 1967, Israelis were allowed to visit 
the USSR on tourist visas; an Israeli journalist delegation 
traveled to the USSR on an official invitation; and Israeli and 
Soviet rabbis exchanged visits...The Soviet Union opened up its 
archives on the Holocaust to Israeli researchers; the Israeli 
Philharmonic orchestra was invited to play in Moscow and 
Leningrad; Israeli films were shown at the Moscow film festival 
for the first time....49 
In addition, teaching exchanges were established, Soviet groups 
reciprocated with visits to Israel, and in September, 1989, the Bolshoi 
Ballet arrived in Israel for an historic performance. 
Israel began to increase its contacts with the other republic of the 
USSR, with athletic and cultural delegations from Estonia, Lithuania, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia exchanging visits. These republics were all 
seeking greater freedom in trade and autonomy from Moscow, and 
occasionally ran into difficulties in this regard, as was the case with Israeli 
Agriculture Minister Avraham Katz-Oz, who had been invited to attend a 
flower exhibition in Estonia, but was denied a Soviet visa. ] 
Although the USSR made some headway in the pursuit of a solution to 
the Middle East peace problem, notably after talks between Shevardnadze 
Ibid,, p. 76. 49T 
50Helen Kaye, Terusalem Post. September 11,1989. 
3lFreedman, Robert. Soviet Policy(Gorbachev), p. 77. 
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and Mubarak in 1989, the Soviet Union continued to falter in its efforts to 
lure Israel to the negotiating table. This reluctance on Israel's part is 
largely due to the Soviets' continued call for an international peace 
conference in which the PLO would be participating as the representative 
of the Palestinian people. 
Israel was also reluctant to respond to Gorbachev's 1989-1990 moves 
toward closer relations because of the USSR's continued actions in support 
of countries perceived to be a real threat to Israel's security; the Soviet 
Union's sale of SU-24 fighter-bombers to Libya, for example, a country still 
52 pledged to the destruction of Israel, perturbed the Israelis greatly, and 
cast doubts on the sincerity of Moscow's desire for a rapprochement. 
In the early 1990's the pace of the contact between Israel and many of 
the republics and former republics of the USSR was increasing rapidly. 
One month after abortive coup in August, 1991, the USSR reversed its 
position on the United Nations declaration that "Zionism is Racism." This 
was facilitated by the removal of several of the old conservative hard- 
liners in the wake of the coup attempt. Speaking at the United Nations on 
September 25,1991, Boris Pankin, the new Soviet Foreign Minister stated: 
The philosophy of new international solidarity signifies, as 
confirmed in practice, the de-ideologizing of the U.N. Our 
organization has been renewed and it is imperative that once 
and for all it rejects the legacy of the 'Ice Age' in which Zionism 
was compared with racism in an odious resolution. 
On April 10, 1992 Kazakhstan established diplomatic relations with 
Israel after the visit of the Israeli ambassador to Alma-Ata. This visit was 
followed by that of Simcha Dinitz, President of the World Jewish Congress 
who met with Kazakh President Nazarbaev to discuss business and 
banking ties.54 Later that month Russian Vice-President Alexander 
Rutskoi, then still an ally of Yeltsin, traveled to Israel. In a statement made 
upon his arrival, he declared that, "We consider Israel to be a very 
important place because of all the Russians who now live here," and later, 
"Israel and Russia have a great opportunity for the development of mutual 
Ibid, p. 74-75. 52I 
53the New York Times. September 25,1991. 
54Bess Brown, RFE/RL Report, 14 April, 1992. 
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cooperation and a blossoming relationship."55 While differences still 
existed over the issue of emigration, bilateral relations improved as a 
result of the Rutskoi visit, during which a memorandum of understanding 
was signed regarding agriculture and business.56 Israeli Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres met with similar success in Central Asia in July, 1994, after 
agreements were reached with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan covering air 
traffic, tourism, mutual protection of investments. 
Diplomatic relations were finally re-established between Israel and the 
Soviet Union in October, 1991, during the visit of Israeli Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres. Although the Soviet Union would cease to exist only 
several months later, the diplomatic tie which the emerging country of 
Russia would inherit had basically been established in the midst of the 
transition away from the Soviet Union, which had not existed in its true 
sense for a long while. 
The re-establishment of relations was, as was reported by Izvestia on 
October 14, also in conjunction with the visit to the Soviet Union of a large 
delegation of Israeli business representatives who were eager to expand 
business relations. According to a TASS report regarding the meeting, 
"Peres has close links with business circles in his country that are 
58 interested in expanding cooperation with the Soviet Union." 
All of these events set the stage for the April 1994 visit of Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Moscow, an historical event which confirmed 
the vast political change which has occurred between the two countries. 
Rabin indicated to the press his desire to establish a dialogue with the top 
Russian leadership, "so that this activity will be in the framework of the 
two superpowers." He also stated that he sought to clarify Israel's position 
to the Russian leadership with the intention that Russia could play a 
positive role, "as it has done in Yugoslavia."59 In addition, Rabin was 
seeking public assurances from high Russian officials that they would act 
against recent manifestations of anti-Semitism, and the prospects for 
55Dan TzPnhiiTg.TerusalemPost. April 30,1992. 
56Freedman, Robert. Working Paper: "Israeli-Russian Relations Since the Collapse 
of the Soviet Union, "Baltimore Hebrew University, November, 1994. 
57Bess Brown, RFE/RL Reports, 5-6 July, 1994. 
58TASS, 2 October, 1991 (FBIS: USSR. 3 October, 1991, p. 4) 
59Reuters, The New York Times. April 23,1994. 
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advancing the Middle East peace talks, which Moscow was co-sponsoring 
along with the United States.60 
The changes in policy which have taken place indicate the depth of 
ideological change in Moscow. There were new priorities; maintaining the 
rivalry of the superpowers with the United States was certainly no longer 
one of them. The domestic political factors which played a role in the 
Russo-Israeli rapprochement were indeed quite significant. An 
atmosphere of desperation had befallen the Soviet Union, their system 
doomed because of its inability to meet the constantly growing demands 
of its own ruling elite, not to mention the needs of subsistence of the 
average citizen. In fact, when Gorbachev decided to re-establish relations 
with Israel in 1991, he did so under great internal political pressures at 
home. 
In the aftermath of the abortive coup, major changes were 
taking place in the USSR. The individual republics, led by 
Russia under Boris Yeltsin became increasingly assertive, the 
Baltic states were given permission to leave the USSR, and 
Gorbachev found himself in a far weaker political position. The 
Soviet leader, over the next few months, was to strive to arrange 
a new union agreement, which would preserve his position as 
the country's leader, but he was to run into increasing 
opposition from both Yeltsin and the leader of the Ukraine, 
Leonid Kravchuk. J 
Gorbachev was struggling to maintain his political footing in a country 
that was crumbling around him. The liberals had been advocating the re- 
establishment of relations with Israel for quite some time, while the 
conservatives were strongly opposed to it. "It would thus appear that the 
Soviet media reports dealing with the decision to resume diplomatic 
relations with Israel were aimed, at least in part, at convincing otherwise 
reluctant members of the Soviet elite and population that the resumption 
of diplomatic relations with Israel would serve to aid the USSR's 
increasingly faltering economy as well as satisfying the United States." 
Aligning himself more closely with the foreign policy of the United States, 
60Erlanger, Steven. The New York Times. April 26,1994. 
61Freedman, Robert. Working Paper: Israeli-Russian Relations, p. 2. 
62Ibid.. p. 4. 
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particularly vis-a-vis the Middle East, Gorbachev was in a more favorable 
position to request economic aid, of critical importance to his own political 
survival. In a reorientation of Soviet policy in the Middle East, Moscow 
campaigned alongside the United States to co-sponsor a peace conference 
which would not only reconfirm the Soviet Union's prestige and status as 
a world power, but also prove that Gorbachev was still in control. 
5. Soviet Jewry 
Meanwhile, one manifestation of the rapprochement was the growing 
success in the Soviet Jewish movement for freedom. This was a highly 
political and emotionally charged issue, involving not only Israel and the 
Soviet Union, but the United States as well. Moscow had long feared a 
"brain-drain" to the West, particularly to the U.S. Since the rivalry of the 
two superpowers was no longer a concern, and Yeltsin had his hands full 
dealing with other issues, worrying about a threat from the United States 
became no longer so important. It is in this scenario of Russia's struggle 
for basic survival that Moscow has become much more flexible regarding 
the emigration of her Jewish population. 
Human rights activists and human rights-oriented political leaders, as 
well as leaders of Jewish groups have for many years lobbied strongly to 
advance the cause of freedom for the Russian and Soviet Jews denied 
permission to emigrate. The freedom to emigrate was used as a tool by 
Soviet leadership to control the population and eliminate potentially 
destabilizing social elements. In this way, the Soviet technique of 
managing instability by allowing certain select elements of society to 
emigrate also was useful for propaganda purposes, "winning points" for 
the government's "benevolence" and "respect for the individual," 
whenever the numbers were on the rise. 
The emigration of Soviet Jewry has been simultaneously both a 
political issue and a symptom of the political climate in the USSR, 
primarily vis-a-vis Soviet relations with the West, although it was the 
official policy of the Soviet Union to deny any link between economic and 
trade relations with the United States and Soviet Jewish emigration, as 
was reiterated by Pravda on December 19, 1974, on the occasion of the 
passage of the controversial Jackson-Vanik Amendment by the United 
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States Congress, a provision of the 1974 Trade Act which linked granting 
the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status to a more liberal Soviet policy 
toward emigration. 
Detente with the West, specifically U.S.-Soviet relations, 
formed the backdrop for emigration during the 1970's. If viewed 
in isolation, the linkage the barometer thesis establishes between 
detente and emigration seems plausible, for Jewish emigration 
levels rose in the early 1970's as U.S.-Soviet relations grew 
warmer... Soviet negotiators undoubtedly realized that 
increased emigration fostered good relations and a more relaxed 
international atmosphere, and could thus be used as a 
concession to advance the goals of detente.63 
One should not go so far as to simply attribute the increase in Jewish 
emigration to the thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations as the solitary cause, 
however, although the United States had indeed been urging the Soviets 
throughout the 1970's and 80's to exercise more leniency in letting people 
emigrate who desired to do so. If one believes that an increase in 
emigration was allowed in 1987 solely in order to better U.S.-Soviet 
relations prior to the December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev summit, one must 
then question why emigration of this magnitude did not occur prior to 
either the 1985 summit meeting in Geneva or the 1986 summit in 
Reykjavik. The decision to allow increased emigration was based on a 
strategy not only for improving U.S.-Soviet relations, but also for dealing 
with the tremendous political pressures and social dynamics occurring 
inside the Soviet Union during the late 1980's. 
After the first two years of Gorbachev's time in office, during which 
there was a strict clampdown on emigration and subsequently little hope 
for approval and few applicants, there was a great turnaround in policy. 
In contrast to the previously decreasing numbers of emigrants; in 1987, 
8,155 Jews were allowed to emigrate; this number consisted largely of 
refuseniks whose cases were finally being resolved. In 1988 the number 
jumped to 18,965, and consisted mostly of first-time emigration applicants. 
In 1989 emigration took a tremendous leap, with 71,196 Jews departing the 
Salitan, Laurie. Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Tewish 
Emigration. 1968-89. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. p. 85. 
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Soviet Union. There was also a significant number of Soviet Germans who 
were allowed to emigrate during these years. 
Allowing the refuseniks to emigrate meant that the USSR 
could begin to rid itself of a large group of emigration activists 
whose skills were already lost to the Soviet Union (since most 
refuseniks had been dismissed from their jobs after filing 
emigration applications). Emigration of the refuseniks also 
enabled the Soviet Union to reduce the number of divided 
families actively seeking reunification, a problem it had 
committed to resolve by signing the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Today the question of Jewish emigration remains an important issue 
in Russo- Israeli relations. Immigrants may now fly directly to Israel from 
Russia and many other places. With the economic systems doing so 
poorly and the uncertain political future there, Jews from the former 
Soviet Union have been emigrating to Israel in record numbers. This 
phenomenon has been even more true since the United States began 
restricting the numbers of Jews it would accept from the former Soviet 
Union and imposing suffer limits on immigration, since few could still 
qualify for asylum by claiming persecution for religious reasons. Thus, 
Jewish emigrants have fewer choices of destinations. More than 500,000 of 
them have emigrated from the former Soviet Union to Israel since 1989, 
raising the population in Israel by more than 10%. Immigration peaked at 
200,000 in 1990 and 176,000 in 1991, and slowed to 80,000 in 1992 and 
about 60,000 in 1993, as news traveled home about hardships in Israel. In 
general, these immigrants have a higher standard of education and 
training than the native population. However, in a country that was 
already suffering from an unemployment problem, such a heavy influx of 
people seeking mid- to high-level jobs can create serious problems. 
"ibid,, p- 98. 
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6. Public Opinion 
Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost enabled Soviet citizens to take a fresh 
look at their own system, and many found it to be lacking. The openness 
and honesty which began to fill the newspapers in the late 1980's fueled a 
discontent which has been growing since that time. Public opinion has 
come to play an increasingly important role in today's Russian politics, as 
citizens are no longer forbidden from expressing opinions contrary to the 
government's policy, and politicians now realize that their positions are 
not guaranteed by the Communist Party, but dependent upon the support 
of their own constituents. 
The primary factor which appears responsible for the way public 
opinion is formed is economics. With the average monthly wage in early 
1994 at around $87 per month, and that being eleven times what it was in 
January 1992,6 the Russian people have been emerging from a period of 
great economic uncertainty and frustration. With greater exposure to the 
West and a growing awareness of how poor off they are in comparison to 
western countries, public opinion has taken two main courses: either 
embracing the West and longing for a closer relationship which could reap 
benefits at home, the course that has been pursued by Boris Yeltsin, or the 
bitter rejectionism of western institutions and a desire to find the answer 
from within Russia, placing the blame on "foreign" elements. This latter, 
more radical view is typified by the neo-Fascist leader Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky. 
Russians manifested their desire for stability when they voted for 
Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party in the December 1993 elections, 
where he won nearly a quarter of the vote. 
Rising discontent about Russia's declining economic 
condition increased Zhirinovsky's appeal between the 1991 and 
1993 elections, and as the economy continues to falter, Russian 
commentators suggest that his appeal will continue to grow. His 
base of support consists of well-educated young males from 
larger cities, older less-educated males from smaller cities, 
67„ Don't Panic." The New Rppnhlir. January 10,1994. p. 9. 
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disgruntled rural residents and numerous members of the 
Russian armed forces.68 
The choice was perceived as being solely between Yeltsin and 
Zhirinovsky, since the Communist Party, although it did receive quite a 
few votes, had lost its credibility and the campaign of reformers such as 
the Russia's Choice Party was ineffective. Some believe that the quasi-Nazi 
attitude of Zhirinovsky can only be countered by effective economic 
69 
resolutions and a transitory abstention from democracy. 
Zhirinovsky has rekindled in Russia a new wave of anti-Semitism, part 
of his platform of neo-imperialism (including expansionism and racism) 
which has attracted a broad spectrum of popular support. This was 
denied, however, by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
during his discussions with Yitzhak Rabin in Moscow; he stated that, "no 
Zhirinovsky will be able to incite a serious upsurge in anti-Semitism in 
70 Russia. I can tell you unequivocally that this will not happen." Even 
under the Soviet government there was a latent anti-Jewish sentiment 
among many Soviet citizens, thanks to the strong negative impact of more 
than seventy years of anti-Zionist propaganda. 
Since the caustic ultranationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky 
rode xenophobia and economic fears to win [in the December 
elections], the scarcely dormant fears of Russian Jews have been 
reawakened, and more have expressed an interest in 
emigrating. Mr. Zhirinovsky, of Jewish stock on his father's side, 
has made intermittent anti-Semitic remarks, though he denies 
71 being anti-Semitic. 
Zhirinovsky has utilized an age-old tactic for rallying support- targeting a 
scapegoat for the country's ills, blaming "someone else" for the loss of the 
nation's former "days of glory," and advocating an ethnically pure Russian 
state with the most powerful army in the world. He pledged to put an end 
to Russia's "national humiliation" by granting privileges to businessmen to 
^ipp, Jacob. "The Zhirinovsky Threat." Foreign Affairs. May/June 1994. p. 74. 
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counter foreign competition, to increase arms exports, and to provide 
husbands to unwed women and cheap vodka for all.72 Having placed 
third in the Russian presidential elections of June, 1991, Zhirinovsky 
actually managed to send "volunteers" from his party to aid Iraq in its 
confrontation with "the United States and Israel."73 
In a survey of public opinion conducted by the Soviet Center for Public 
Opinion and Market Research in conjunction with the American Jewish 
Committee throughout the former Soviet Union in late 1990 and later 
again throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States in the spring 
of 1992 (including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) plus the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania, certain trends became detectable in public opinion towards 
ethnicity, minorities, and Jews in particular. (Not to mention the fact that 
the mere existence of such an institution devoted to this purpose gives 
clear indication of the changing times.) Yet some of these trends 
manifested in the surveys seem to contradict and oppose one another. 
The attitudes are not monolithic, in fact, they vary significantly 
depending on the particular state involved as well as the issue in question. 
Out of a total of 144 questions in 1992, 34 were about attitudes toward 
Jews. Based on the average change per question for those items appearing 
in both the 1990 and the 1992 surveys, the overall trend with regard to 
popular attitudes toward Jews is generally negative, demonstrating an 
increase in anti-Jewish hostility- with the exceptions of in the Ukraine and 
Moldova, where the overall trend has been toward the positive. In Russia 
in particular, the average change per item (-3 points) is largely unchanged. 
The largest shifts in opinion in a negative direction appear when 
respondents were asked about various types of contact with Jews and 
about equal rights for Jews as an ethnic group. (The overall perceived 
trend, "Do you believe that anti-Semitism has increased or decreased in 
your republic ?" has been that it has decreased in Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Moldova, however.) These views, however, are largely less critical than 
the prejudice toward other indigenous Soviet minority groups, including 
2Kipp, Jacob, p. 74. 
3Freedman, Robert. Working Paper: Israeli-Russian Relations, p. 12. 
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Gypsies, Armenians, Chechens and others.74 Despite this negative trend, 
there is still widespread belief in equal rights, fair treatment, and the 
virtues of Jews as individuals. 
Positive opinion changes in Russia include the perception that Jews are 
hard workers (from 45% agreement in 1990 to 53% in 1992), kind and 
peaceful (from 36% to 41%); Zionism was also viewed as less of a threat, 
moving away from the earlier perception that Zionism was a policy for 
establishing the world supremacy of the Jews, from 21% to 17%.76 
In 1990, the question was asked, "Do you think that the Soviet Union 
should or shouldn't renew diplomatic relations with Israel?" The response 
was overwhelmingly positive across the board.77 In the 1992 survey this 
question was redundant. However, when asked in 1992 about the Middle 
East conflict, whether they felt more sympathy with the Arabs or the 
Israelis, the majority of respondents in each of the ten states except Estonia 
answered with the Arabs. Furthermore, when asked if they sympathized 
more with the Palestinians or the Israelis, in every country except Estonia, 
the Palestinians were favored among the respondents who were willing to 
78 
make the choice. Views about Zionism and Israel have generally become 
more negative in the Islamic states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Azerbaijan, who have been experiencing the growth of inter ethnic 
tensions in the past few years and experiencing a resurgence of Islam 
throughout the formerly secular central Asian republics. 
7. Bureaucratic Structure 
The change in the bureaucratic structure throughout Russia after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union is another important factor in explaining the 
4Gudkov, Lev and Alex Levinson. Working Paper: 'Attitudes Toward Jews in 
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change in tenor of government policy. Prior to the abortive coup in 
August, 1991, there remained in office many "old-school" Communists, 
staunchly conservative members of the government who were not 
supportive of Gorbachev's reforms and political ideas, to include the 
rapprochement with Israel. The coup attempt gave Gorbachev an ideal 
excuse to expel these individuals from the political machine; this included 
some of his close associates. Throughout the Soviet nomenklatura, the 
people were given the opportunity to vote out of office those individuals 
who were perceived to be corrupt and self-serving. 
Some individuals who were Communist Party members and remain in 
office have changed their beliefs; some were never really Communists in 
the first place except in name. Meanwhile others claim a new party 
affiliation, but retain all of their old communist beliefs and practices. 
Enough of each kind remain today to create controversy for President 
Yeltsin. 
The period between the abortive coup in August 1991 and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was indeed the period of the most 
rapid change in Russo-Israeli relations. Gorbachev did not rush into the 
establishment of relations directly after the coup attempt, nor was he 
pushing the rapprochement prior to the coup attempt. 
In the year prior to the abortive coup, Gorbachev moved to 
the right politically, a process punctuated by Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze's December 1990 resignation in protest to 
Gorbachev's policies. The conservative forces whose views 
were being publicly espoused by such Soviet newspapers as 
Pravda and Sovietskaya Rossiya, were negatively disposed toward 
Israel, and this may have been one of the reasons why 
Gorbachev delayed raising the level of diplomatic relations with 
Israel to the full ambassadorial status, and opposed the 'Zionism 
as Racism' resolution. With the power of the conservatives in 
eclipse after the coup, however, Gorbachev was freer to move 
on relations with Israel. 9 
79 Freedman, Robert, Working Paper: Israeli-Russian Relations, p. 1-2. 
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B. ISRAEL 
1. Political Situation 
The change in the political tide in Israel also facilitated the 
rapprochement with Russia. As it was the Soviets who broke off relations 
with Israel in 1967, it was the Soviets who had to decide to approach Israel 
about the re-establishment of relations. The Israelis had consistently 
demonstrated a willingness to talk and to work with the Soviets towards 
this goal. 
As opposed to Israel's earlier years under the strong conservative 
leadership of personalities like Menachem Begin, the Likud-led National 
Unity government under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, which was 
established at the end of 1988, met with constant opposition from the more 
conciliatory Labor party, which was more willing to be flexible in 
negotiating for peace with the Palestinian people. The Labor Party, in turn, 
was frequently attacked by the Likud for being "soft" on the PLO. 
The real divisive issue was the question of a Middle East peace 
conference, to be sponsored either by the Soviets (and later the Russians), 
the United States, or both, and supported by a number of other countries. 
These efforts ultimately culminated in the Madrid Conference of October, 
1991 which laid the foundation for Arab-Israeli talks. Some were 
adamantly opposed to this idea, such as Yitzhak Shamir, who criticized 
the plan for an international conference as "national suicide" ; while 
others were in favor of the plan but argued over its terms. This 
disagreement precipitated a political battle with Shimon Peres (Labor), the 
former Prime Minister and current Foreign Minister, and Yitzhak Shamir 
(Likud). His government did gain greater support during the Intifada, (the 
Palestinian uprising) which began in December, 1987 and lasted until the 
beginning of the Gulf Crisis. Israel's National Unity government became 
wrought with internal contradictions between Labor and Likud over the 
peace process, and there was disagreement within Likud itself over the 
role that Moscow should be permitted to play in Middle East diplomacy. 
80Freedman, Robert. Soviet Policy (Gorbachev), p. 37. 
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These factors contributed to the weakening of the National Unity 
government, which collapsed in mid-March, 1990. 
From the viewpoint of the Shamir government, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in December, 1991 brought forth four major concerns: first 
was the fear that the nuclear weapons belonging to various states of the 
former Soviet Union might be sold to Israel's enemies, such as Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, or Libya, given the economically dire straits in which most of the 
new states found themselves, or that nuclear scientists from these states 
might be persuaded into working for these countries. Secondly, the Israeli 
government was quite concerned that there might be an interruption in 
the Jewish emigration to Israel, that the agreement made by Gorbachev 
might not be honored under a new government. Third, Israeli leaders 
were concerned that the favorable political position it enjoyed with the 
Soviet Union, with whom it had re-established diplomatic relations only 
two months earlier, might be jeopardized, and that the situation was 
rendered even more uncertain with the emergence of six new Islamic 
states: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Kirghizistan. And finally, Israel hoped to not only maintain but even 
develop the bilateral relations in the areas of trade and culture not only 
with Russia, but the other newly independent states as well.81 
The next real turning point in Israeli politics was the defeat of the 
Likud party in the elections of June, 1992, and the advent of a Labor 
government led by Yitzhak Rabin. Said to preside over one of the most 
dovish governments since the war of 1967, there were indeed very bright 
prospects for an Israeli peace accord with the Palestinians, which would 
greatly facilitate a rapprochement with anyone supportive of them, as the 
Russians had been. This development would allow Russia to maintain her 
integrity as a supporter of the Palestinians and their fellow Arabs and 
simultaneously work toward closer relations with Israel, since Israel was 
working for and willing to make peace with the Palestinians. This was, 
according to Russia, an important prerequisite. 
81 Freedman, Robert. Working Paper: Israeli-Russian Relations, p. 8-9. 
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2. The Palestinians 
On September 13,1993 at the White House, a Declaration of Principles 
was signed by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir Arafat and 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in the presence of U.S. President Bill 
Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and other 
governmental officials, guaranteeing to the Palestinian people, 
represented by the PLO, their rights to an interim self-government 
arrangement in the Gaza Strip and in Jericho. This major event was largely 
heralded in the West as well as in Russia, but met with divided opinion in 
the Arab world; some groups supported Arafat and the Palestine National 
Council's policy of cooperation with Israel, while others, notoriously the 
radical Hamas' terrorist organization, felt that Arafat had betrayed the 
Palestinian people by settling for anything less than their ultimate goal- 
the establishment of a Palestinian state via the destruction of the state of 
Israel. 
Meanwhile, Israel's relations with Russia were expanding on many 
fronts, as President Yeltsin continued to follow U.S. policies on most 
Middle East issues, including the enforcement of U.N. sanctions against 
Libya, their former ally of many years. Particularly in the wake of the 
April 1994 visit of Prime Minister Rabin to Moscow, many joint ventures 
were initiated. In May, 1994 Russia signed a tentative agreement to begin 
supplying oil and natural gas to Israel over a 10-year period, with 
payment in advance each year.82 In June, 1994 an agreement was signed 
which will allow the United States and Israel to conduct joint business 
operations in the former Soviet Union, the countries aiming to match U.S. 
entrepreneurs with Soviet-born Israelis familiar with business operations 
in their former homeland.83 September, 1994 witnessed a pledge between 
Russia and Israel on space cooperation; both parties signed a 
memorandum of understanding for cooperation in civilian and 
commercial uses of space, especially in the area of commercial satellites. 
Both countries' space agencies could then, "consider freely and mutually 
82 
83 
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the economic potential of space industries and the research of the 
countries."84 
3. Public Opinion 
Although public opinion among Jews has been generally supportive of 
the rapprochement with Russia, there are certain exceptions. Some Israelis 
are suspicious of Russia's continuing loyalty and motives, especially given 
the uncertain political situation within the Russian government and the 
strong opposition to Yeltsin. Some Israelis feel that their economy is being 
overburdened by the massive influx of former Soviet Jews; even the 
Palestinians have been affected by these immigrants, via the exacerbation 
of the unemployment problem. "The immigration had both an indirect 
effect on Palestinians by straining the already fragile economy they 
depended upon and, later, a direct impact as Soviets filled the menial jobs 
Arabs had formerly held. In the early 1990's, overqualified Palestinians- 
the products of the expanding educational system- and overqualified 
Soviet Jews eyed the same low-level jobs."85 Some Hasidic and 
Lubavitcher Jews in Russia protested during Prime Minister Rabin's visit 
because of his willingness to return land for peace to the Arabs; the impact 
of these demonstrations was nominal, but illustrates that support was not 
universal.86 
4. Immigration of Former Soviet Jews 
Immigration is one of the main issues surrounding Russo-Israeli 
relations today. From Israel's perspective, there is no question whether 
Israel should accept so many new immigrants at one time; that is Israel's 
purpose and the meaning of Zionism, a haven to which the Jews of the 
world should immigrate. The difficulty lies in the logistics of resettling all 
of the new citizens in a way which proves productive and satisfying for 
all. 
^Siegel, Tudv. Terusalem Post. September 10,1994. 
°Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel Migdal. Palestinians: The Making of a Pponlp 
New York: The Free Press, 1993. p. 259. 
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Some people find themselves disappointed, having had unrealistic 
expectations about their new standard of living and immediate quality of 
life. Cultural differences and differences in work ethics and career 
aspirations have caused many new Israeli immigrants to become 
disillusioned. The Israeli government has been trying to successfully 
absorb these new citizens as fast as possible, but many have still not been 
able to find work or permanent housing. In addition, differences in 
religious practice have caused certain rifts in the Israeli society itself; Jews 
from the former Soviet Union have, over the decades, become quite 
secularized in comparison with the native Israelis. Mandatory synagogue 
attendance is simply too much for some people, Jewish in name only. 
Furthermore, as reported by the New York Times on October 6, 1994, 
there have even been incidents, and not infrequently, where new Israeli 
immigrants have turned out not to be Jewish at all; they merely claimed to 
be Jewish after being lured to Israel by the stories of the better quality of 
life and resettlement assistance given to new immigrants under the Israeli 
"Law of Return," which grants immediate citizenship and resettlement 
assistance, including direct financial grants, to all Jews who move to Israel. 
Public opinion among native Israelis has also undergone a significant 
change since the influx of Soviet Jews began. 
It has not taken long for things to turn sour. At first, the 
Russians were greeted with excitement. Volunteers bestowed 
smiles and flowers as the new arrivals disembarked at the 
airport. Now Israelis are bored by articles describing the latest 
planeload of violinists and piano tuners. And for thousands of 
newcomers who are still marooned, unemployed, in drab 
caravan sites dotted around the country, the 'ascent' to Zion has 
been a disillusionment. Having punished the Likud in the 1992 
elections, the Russian immigrants have recently mounted large 
protest demonstrations against the Labor government too.87 
Furthermore, Israel has had to contend with international criticism 
regarding the settlement of former Soviet Jews within the occupied 
territories; this has become a political battle within Israel itself- between 
the conservative Likud and the more liberal Labor parties. Yitzhak Shamir 
87
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created quite a stir in the international arena, not to mention damaging the 
efforts of political rival and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin for a Middle 
East peace conference, after proclaiming in a January, 1990 speech that the 
occupied territories were actually needed to house all of Israel's new 
immigrants from Russia. This placed Russia in a politically awkward 
position; the new immigrants were then being used as an excuse by Israel 
not to honor the rights of the Palestinians who resided there, causing 
friction between these two groups. 
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IV.  INTERNATIONAL EVENTS ANALYSIS 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the external international events 
which were occurring and which had a definite impact on the politics of 
both Russia and Israel, which in turn, affected the rapprochement between 
Russia and Israel, to include Middle East politics, the changing political 
situation in Europe, and the influence of the United States. 
A. THE QUEST FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE PLAN 
No international event such as a rapprochement between two 
countries takes place in a vacuum; although the re-establishment of 
relations and their subsequent improvement and development may have 
been initiated for domestic reasons, events happening in the international 
arena have a great influence on the "why" and the "when" that these 
changes occur. Russia and Israel are no exception to this. 
The roots of today's change in the Middle East dates back to November 
1977 and the historic visit of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat to 
Jerusalem to speak in the Knesset, which led to the Camp David Accords 
of 1978 between Egypt and Israel, under the mediation of the United 
States and President Jimmy Carter. This historic agreement, signed in 
September, 1979 marks the beginning of an era of cooperation between 
Israel and the Arabs, the first attempt to trade land for peace. It caused 
shock and precipitated a very hard line among the leaders of the Likud 
government in Israel, due to the concessions to which Begin agreed. This 
conviction also caused widespread unrest and deep cleavages in the Arab 
world and ultimately cost Sadat his life. 
These agreements were followed by the solid foundation laid at the 
Madrid Peace Conference of October 1991, which overcame the 
impediments to direct Arab-Israeli talks and launched a real peace 
process. This conference represented the culmination of the efforts of 
several countries, including Russia, Israel and the United States. 
The Israelis were able to deal successfully with the Egyptians over 
withdrawal from the Sinai; they were less successful in dealing with the 
areas inhabited by the Palestinians, namely the West Bank, and the Gaza 
Strip. Cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians did not come easily 
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nor quickly, and it was this bone of contention which remained one of the 
issues which separated Israel from the Soviet Union for years to come, 
according to Soviet declarations. 
Years of struggle between Israel and the Palestinians, backed by the 
Soviet Union, were ended by the beginning of real cooperation and 
advancements in the quest for peace between these two nations at the 
Madrid Peace Conference, and then later again in September, 1993, when 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasir Arafat signed a 
Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 
granting the Palestinians the right to elect a "Council" for self-government 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Agreement provides for the 
immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Jericho area and the Gaza Strip, 
and a transitional period of five years for permanent status negotiations. 
The issues to be negotiated during the transitional period include 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations 
and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common 
mterest. 
This Agreement was the fruit of the labors of not only Israel and the 
PLO, but also the United States and Norway, who acted as mediators. 
Russia was represented at the signing ceremony by Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev, who gave a brief congratulatory speech in which he re- 
emphasized Russia's position as a "true and determined co-sponsor" to 
seek peace for Israel and its neighbors, the legitimate rights of the 
en 
Palestinians, and the stability of the whole region. Russia'a actual role in 
the peace process, however, was more ceremonial than functional, as it 
was also previously at the Madrid Conference. 
Progress toward peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors was 
definitely a prerequisite for the eventual rapprochement between Russia 
(or the former Soviet Union) and Israel; the Soviet Union had sworn to 
back its Arab allies, and without any sort of concessions on Israel's part, 
the Soviet Union would have been seen as a traitor had it made any 
diplomatic moves in Israel's direction. With the dawn of Arab-Israeli 
88The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration Of Principles, Articles I & V, September 13, 
1993. 
89Kozyrev, Andrei. Speech of September 13,1993. 
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cooperation, however, the USSR was able to maintain its integrity while 
exploring the possibility of improved relations with Israel. As Israel 
obviously began demonstrating a desire for greater cooperation, the 
USSR, and later Russia, could honorably face its Arab friends without 
chagrin. 
The Arab states themselves were not always in harmony with one 
another. As it used to do in its own Union Republics, the Soviet Union 
often used the tactic of encouraging dissent and fragmentation among 
certain countries in order to discourage coalition-building which could 
pose a threat to Soviet authority. One notorious example of this was 
Stalin's establishment of the Nagorno-Karabagh region of ethnic 
Armenians, entirely situated within the borders of Azerbaijan; this has 
kept the two new states at odds with one another, and too unstable to pose 
a threat to Moscow. Such was also the case in Soviet policy toward the 
Middle East. 'There is substance to the contention that the Soviet Union 
[needed] Israel so that the Arab world's antagonism to the Jewish state 
will increase its dependency upon Moscow for arms and political 
support."90 The Soviet Union had signed treaties of Friendship and 
Cooperation with Syria, one of Israel's enemies, in addition to Iraq, 
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and North and South Yemen; it had supported 
Libya, Lebanon, and Egypt (in some capacities), and generally supported 
the Arab cause against their "oppressors," said to be the Israelis. 
B. SYRIA 
Syria had had a long and close relationship with the Soviet Union, 
nurtured by their consistent support of the Arabs' position in their 
confrontations with the Israelis and often even with other Arab states. The 
Soviets had supplied the Syrians with high levels of economic and 
military aid ever since the French stopped supplying them in 1954. Syria, 
however, did not always act in accordance with Soviet wishes, having 
joined the United Arab Republic with Egypt in 1958, and refused to attend 
the 1973 Geneva conference on Middle East peace. Over the years, Syria 
90Carter, Jimmy. Thp Blood of Ahraham: Insights into the Middle East. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985. p. 17. 
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has not hesitated to exercise its own will in defiance of its alliance with the 
Soviet Union, and as the Soviet Union's relationship with Israel has 
improved, their relationship with Syria has deteriorated. This reflects a 
revaluation of Soviet interests in the Middle East between Brezhnev and 
Gorbachev. 
These changes were clearly evident during Eduard Shevardnadze's 
visit to Syria in 1989, where Syrian President Hafez el-Asad reiterated his 
desire for military parity with Israel and his refusal to work for improved 
ties with Egypt, Iraq, the PLO and Jordan.91 Moscow was working for a 
peaceful solution to Middle East peace based on cooperation, but Syria, 
under el-Asad's obstinate leadership, would not budge. No doubt he also 
must have felt betrayed by his long-time ally who was suddenly making 
overtures toward Syria's enemies. 
The change in the Soviets' position toward Syria was expressed quite 
bluntly by the Soviet ambassador to Syria, Alexander Zotov, in November, 
1989 in an article published by the Washington Post. This article stated that 
"new realities" in the USSR would henceforth limit Soviet military 
assistance to Syria, noting that the Soviets' ability to assist Syria was 
limited and that Syria's ability to pay for it was in doubt. The article 
continued that Syria needed to recognize "reasonable defensive 
sufficiency," and that Moscow would not support Syria in any kind of 
attack against Israel.92 
The declining relations between Syria and the USSR contributed to the 
ability of the USSR to shift its policy more toward Israel. Indeed, Syria 
undoubtedly pushed the Soviets in this direction, by means of Assad's 
demands and obstinance. And once the shift had begun to take place, 
Moscow decided to let it continue in this way. 
Simultaneously, the United States has been attempting to normalize 
relations with Syria, knowing that the prospects for a lasting peace are 
much greater if all parties concerned are willing to cooperate. At present 
Syria is considered by them to be neither friend nor enemy. Syria's 
traditional hard-line stance against Israel has made this task a formidable 
challenge. 
Freedman, Robert. Soviet Policy(Gorbachev). p. 69. 
!Ibid.. p. 89-90. 
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C IRAQ 
Another Arab country which has added a twist to the picture of 
Middle East peace is Iraq. In the 1980's, Iraq became one of the most 
important Soviet partners in the Third World. In 1989, Soviet trade with 
Iraq amounted to 1.2 billion rubles, surpassing trade with all other 
developing countries with the exception of India.93 A former ally of the 
Soviet Union, the PLO, and the United States (during their war with Iran), 
Iraq was also a respected colleague among the Arab states- until its 
invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. Iraq has always been an avowed 
enemy of Israel, and both sides have frequently exchanged blows, both 
physical and rhetorical. Iraq's brazen invasion of Kuwait hastily made 
enemies out of Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), and lost the support of the Soviet Union, in the process of 
improving relations with Israel. As was the case with Syria, declining 
relations with this Arab country further enabled the Russo-Israeli 
rapprochement to occur. 
" Iraq spent the next few years attempting to recover from the scars of 
war, and to maintain solid footing despite the sanctions imposed upon the 
regime of Saddam Hussein. Russia's policy towards Iraq has been in line 
with the United States' policy on Iraq. This has directly tied into the 
domestic political opposition in Russia; those who opposed Yeltsin's 
leadership therefore opposed his position on Iraq and were willing to 
excuse Saddam Hussein's actions. 
As in the case of Israel, the issue of Russian-Iraqi relations 
was not only an issue of Russian foreign policy, it was also an 
issue of Russian domestic politics with hardline critics of 
Yeltsin, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, demanding that not only 
should Russia stop supporting U.S. policy on Iraq, but that 
Yeltsin should unilaterally break the embargo against Iraq and 
restore the Russian-Iraqi alliance to what it had been in Soviet 
times. A second group of advocates of Iraq argued that for 
economic reasons Russia should lift the embargo, because in this 
93Melkumyan, Yelena. "Soviet Policy and the Gulf Crisis." The Gulf Crisis: 
Background and Consequences. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1992. p. 81. 
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way it could receive the $5-7 billion in debt owed to Russia by 
Iraq- money badly needed by the hard-pressed Russian 
economy.94 
Indeed, the issue of the unpaid Iraqi debt to Russia was what certainly 
fueled the strong pressure from Yeltsin's opposition to lift the embargo, 
recommence arms sales, and re-establish the former alliance with Iraq. 
This course of action, however, would alienate oil-rich kingdoms of the 
GCC, who were giving Russia financial support, especially Oman, who 
pledged $600 million in aid to develop and modernize Russia's oil fields, 
not to mention endangering U.S.-Russian relations in the Middle East. 
Yeltsin's government continued, however, to maintain low-level contacts 
with Iraq in attempt to maintain the maximum influence there without 
alienating either the United States or the GCC. The strengthening of the 
Russian-Iraqi relationship continues to be a wedge which is used by 
Yeltsin's opposition.95 Russia's desire to maintain a certain level of 
relations with Iraq represents a delicate issue in U.S.-Russian relations, 
and the Russians are therefore being very cautious in maintaining their 
Iraqi contacts. 
D. IRAQ AND THE PLO 
Saddam Hussein's expressed support for the Palestinian people (which 
never materialized) and their subsequent endorsement and support of him 
was a fatal mistake for the Palestinian people, who lost a great deal of 
political and financial support from many of their wealthier fellow Arab 
states of the Gulf. "In the aftermath of the war, the international 
diplomatic position of the PLO became too weak to sustain the 
organization's previous policies of insisting that all Arab-Israeli 
negotiations on the Palestinian issue must include the PLO directly as 
representative of the Palestinian people, and must be aimed at obtaining a 
94Freedman, Robert. Working Paper: "Moscow and the Middle East Since the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union: A Preliminary Analysis." September, 1994. p. 23. 
95Ibid.. p. 24-26. 
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Palestinian state, not at interim measures."96 The PLO had initially 
adopted a position of neutrality after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but 
after it became dear that mediation between Iraq and Kuwait was not 
possible, in addition to Saddam Hussein's rhetoric about Israel's 
withdrawal from occupied Palestine, the PLO could not resist the 
temptation to have the world's attention drawn to their cause. 
The result was probably a positive thing for the PLO after all; in being 
forced to lower their demands, the PLO did finally make it to the 
bargaining table with Israel, where some progress was made. In this way 
they may eventually achieve their political goals gradually and peacefully, 
with the support of the world. 
The attack on Kuwait by Iraq functionally destroyed the potential for 
any mutually beneficial relationship between Iraq and the United States. 
Saddam Hussein's pledge to destroy Israel, a faithful ally of the U.S., 
added emphasis to this reality. The United States has actively sought to 
play a more direct role in the Persian Gulf since the events of 1979 through 
1981, the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the 
doubling of oil prices. Iran and Iraq were seen as the key strategic players 
in this area. The United States had consistently supported Iraq during the 
1980's, when the primary threat in the Gulf was believed to be Iran. 
Suddenly, the picture changed. Who was now the real threat became 
unclear. 
E. IRAQ, IRAN AND THE U.S. 
The United States alternately supported both Iran and Iraq in an 
attempt to keep any one hostile power from taking control of the region. A 
new policy has recently been developed, however, which places a greater 
role on other powers in the area, as well as the United Nations. Officially 
dubbed "Dual Containment," this policy was articulated in May, 1993 by 
Martin Indyk, special assistant to the President for Near East and South 
Asian affairs at the National Security Council. The aim of this policy is to 
96Simpson, Michael. "The Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis." The Gulf Crisis: 
Background and Consequences. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1992. p. 247. 
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isolate both Iran and Iraq regionally, cutting them off from the world 
economic and trading system, and to encourage a change of regime in 
Iraq. And while the old U.S. strategy continued to be to prevent any 
power from supplanting the United States as the dominant force in the 
gulf, the new strategy places greater responsibility on the U.S.' friends in 
the region, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and the GCC.97 
Critics of dual containment argue that dual containment offers no 
guidelines for dealing with change in the area, and that it ties American 
policy to an inherently unstable status quo, in addition to assigning to the 
United States a unilateral role in managing gulf security at a time when 
our influence in the gulf is limited.98 Proponents counter that our current 
circumstances in the gulf are different from before, that we do not seek 
unilaterally to manage gulf security, but to seek along with our regional 
allies, with whom we enjoy greatly improved relations since the Gulf War, 
to maintain a favorable balance without depending on Iraq or Iran. In 
addition, we no longer have as much to fear because a regional balance of 
power has been established between Iraq and Iran at a much lower level 
of conventional offensive military capability, nor is there any longer the 
fear of Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf.99 
Iran still does represent a dangerous uncertainty in the Gulf region, 
one that has influenced the United States in the development of past and 
present defense strategies. Iran remained essentially isolated in the 
immediate post-revolutionary decade; it is not integrated into another 
regional system (as is Turkey with NATO). Throughout the 1980's, Iran 
and the United States shared a mutual distrust and animosity toward one 
another, fueled by events such as the American Embassy hostage crisis, 
the Iran-Contra Affair, and the downing of an Iranian commercial jet by 
the U.S.S. Vincennes. Never was there any doubt in Iran who the "great 
Satan" was- the United States; Iran's revolutionary leadership harbored 
deep grievances over the United States' close ties and support of the shah. 
9
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Even before the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in mid-1989, there was 
political debate raging within the Iranian government over fundamental 
political changes and directions in domestic and foreign policies. The new 
president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and his government indicated after the 
Gulf war a desire for a coordinated re-integration into the regional and 
global political-economic system, having successfully maneuvered his 
moderate party through the imbroglio. Surprisingly, Iran was a 
beneficiary of the Gulf crisis. Iraq suddenly turned to Iran for assistance, 
offering terms which previously would have been unbelievable during 
their war with one another. Also, the strategic importance of Iran was 
bolstered, giving Teheran more power to wield in negotiations for 
economic assistance to their faltering economy. Economic considerations 
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would henceforth overshadow political priorities. 
Although the strategic importance of both Iraq and Iran has been 
dramatically reduced since the fall of the Soviet Union, as Iraq and Iran no 
longer have the ability to play the superpowers off one another, a real 
threat from Iran still exists. The Clinton Administration has outlined a 
"five-part challenge" that Iran poses to the United States and the 
international community: 1) its support for terrorism and assassination 
across the globe, 2) its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
expressed through its support of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, 3) 
its efforts to subvert friendly Arab governments, 4) its military buildup 
aimed at dominating the gulf region, and 5) its quest to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction. 
Israel can be considered a very worthy Middle Eastern opponent to 
the potential threat from Iran and Iraq. From Russia's perspective, Israel 
would make a good partner, in addition to the United States, to counter a 
potential threat emerging from the region. This was one of the many 
factors which Gorbachev initially had to consider, and Yeltsin must bear 
in mind, when weighing current and future policy options. 
100Hart, Jo-Anne. "The Arab Sub-System in Crisis." The Gulf Crisis: Background 
and Consequences. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1992. p.193. 
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F. IRAN AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 
Iran's relations with the former Soviet Union were also changing in the 
post-Iranian revolutionary period. With the Cold War just beginning to 
thaw in 1987, the prospect of an increased Soviet role in the gulf led the 
United States to an increased role providing naval protection to Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia toward the end of the Iran-Iraq war, as the potential for 
the gulf to become the setting for superpower conflict still existed. Indeed, 
while the Soviet Union supported Iraq in its military buildup, it alienated 
the conservative Arab gulf states. These relations were greatly improved 
by the Soviet condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the Cold 
War gradually came to a close, however, the lessening strategic 
importance of the gulf affected Soviet foreign policy by allowing Moscow 
to take a more even-handed approach to Middle East politics. Moscow 
was simultaneously pursuing improved relations with Kuwait in order to 
ensure the continued delivery of oil, and re-evaluating its traditional 
alliances in the region. 
At the same time, the nationalities question was coming to the 
forefront of Soviet politics. This directly affected Moscow's relations with 
Iran. Of continuing concern between the two countries was the status of 
the large Azerbaijani population within Iran, an ethnically homogenous 
group residing on both sides of the Soviet-Iranian border. Moscow was 
also very much concerned about the influence of the resurgence of Islamic 
fundamentalism coming from inside Iran, as this represented a threat to 
the stability of the Soviet Central Asian Republics and the legitimacy of 
the Communist leadership. With the Muslim population inside the Soviet 
Union at approximately 70 million people, fundamentalist Islam was seen 
as a volatile movement which could seriously threaten Soviet stability and 
integrity. 
G. EGYPT 
Islamic fundamentalism was also becoming a real concern in Egypt in 
the late 1980's and early 1990's. The United States and Egypt had enjoyed a 
long and friendly relationship since the early 1970's, proven again during 
the Gulf War, in which Egypt endorsed the U.S.' position on the Iraqi 
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invasion of Kuwait and fought side-by-side with the Americans to expel 
the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's 
leadership, however, did not prove charismatic enough to win him 
widespread support among his own citizens, and radical Islamic groups 
began to flourish. A growing trend of Islamic conservativism has spread 
across the country, with more women wearing the veil than ever before. 
Economically difficult times were exacerbated by rumors of Mubarak's 
corruption and inability to maintain control. Some of these radical groups 
advocated violence, terrorism against tourists, an Iranian-style revolution, 
and challenged his administration within the Egyptian Parliament itself. 
Certain parties which were deemed too radical were outlawed; thereafter 
they joined the underground. 
Meanwhile, the Egyptian economy was lagging, and Egyptian debt to 
the United States was mounting. In 1990, a huge chunk of the Egyptian 
debt to the U.S. was excused in exchange for Egypt's support in the 
condemnation of Iraq and the Egyptian military support during Desert 
Storm. Egypt also reinforced its alliances with Saudi Arabia and the GCC 
in this way. 
Since the Soviet Union was no longer committed to opposing the 
United States during perestroika and after the collapse of the Communist 
government, Russia was then able to also improve its relations with 
Egypt. In 1987 the Soviet Union's primary goal vis-a-vis Egypt was to keep 
it isolated among other Arab states because of its peace treaty with Israel. 
This goal failed, as Arab states decided that each state would decide on its 
own whether or not to re-establish diplomatic relations with Egypt. Egypt 
was needed, in the view of the other Arab states, as a counterweight to 
Iran. 102 Having come a great distance since their days of enmity in the 
1970's and early 80's, Egypt and the USSR experienced a rapprochement in 
1988 which culminated in a diplomatic visit between Egyptian Foreign 
Minister Ismat Abd-el Meguid and Shevardnadze and Gorbachev in 
Moscow. 
Moscow seems to have decided to reject the old policy of 
trying to isolate Egypt if only because by the beginning of 1988, 
Egypt had successfully reintegrated itself into the Arab world 
102Freedman, Robert. Soviet Policy(Gorbachev), p. 41. 
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despite Camp David. Given that Egypt had become an active 
supporter of an international conference to solve the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, Moscow evidently decided to capitalize on 
Egypt's increased influence in the Arab world to help arrange 
the conference or, at a minimum, to politically isolate and bring 
diplomatic presssure on Israel and the United States, who 
continued to oppose the conference.103 
H. ISRAEL AND THE PLO 
Although Moscow had declared its criteria for the re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Israel to be Israel's withdrawal from the 
occupied territories and the restoration of the Palestinians' legitimate 
rights, the signing of the Declaration of Principles represented a solid step 
in that direction, one which opened the door to the Soviet Union. They 
were then able to maintain their national integrity in front of the Arab 
world and justify the actions that were in their new best interests by the 
fact that Israel was complying with their requirements, albeit not entirely. 
Arab countries did not have to feel that their ally had gone back on its 
word, since steps were being taken to provide the Palestinians their 
autonomy. 
Although continuing negotiations between Israel and the PLO stalled 
in 1994 due to an increase in international terrorism by certain radical 
fundamentalist Islamic groups, such as the Hamas' organization which are 
opposed to any kind of compromise, a new series of negotiations took 
place under the mediation of President Clinton in February 1995 between 
the parties who participated in the September 1993 agreements. 
I. THE ROLE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICS 
The United States Government has had a particularly influential role in 
the shaping of international politics for many years; U.S. foreign policy 
has been formulated and implemented due to a myriad of factors which 
represent the interests of the American people. The United States 
Congress has been the forum in which much of this influence takes place. 
103Ibid.. p. 55-56. 
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As early as the mid nineteenth century, members of Congress have 
been subjected to lobbies representing the interests of their constituents 
regarding the United States' relations with Russia, Jewish interests, and 
the nascent Zionist movement, which would culminate in the State of 
Israel. "In 1840, several years after the Ashkenazim had begun arriving 
from Germany, American Jews became involved in the politics of foreign 
policy. With the support of Christian missionaries, this ethnoreligious 
group of some 15,000 members persuaded but did not pressure President 
Martin Van Buren to protest the persecution of Jews in Damascus who 
had been charged with ritual murder." 
Thus began the movement of politicking to assist other Diaspora Jews 
in distress. The original group of Jewish activists grew in the subsequent 
decades, and obtained an influential voice on behalf of persecuted ethno- 
religious brethren in Morocco, Serbia, Romania, and Russia. This Jewish 
ethnic lobby became more effective in the wake of the assassination of 
Czar Alexander II in 1881, which produced anti-Semitic laws and a wave 
of riots against Jews in Russia. These hardships were the impetus for 
many of these persecuted individuals to emigrate to the United States, 
where they often joined the ranks of their fellow Jewish activists. Both new 
and former immigrants bonded together for their common cause, and 
were successful in persuading the White House to remonstrate against the 
Russian pogroms and the mistreatment of Jews in the Ottoman Empire 
and Austria-Hungary. 
These efforts resulted in the introduction in the House of 
Representatives in 1892 by Representative Irvine Dungan of Ohio, a 
resolution which called for the severing of diplomatic relations with 
Russia. Although the resolution did not pass, both the Republican and the 
Democratic Party platforms contained planks which expressed concern for 
abused Jews, 
Among the purportedly new ethnic groups, the Jews thus 
quickly stood out in their ability to bring organized political 
influence to bear on foreign policy. Their effectiveness rose from 
1MDeconde, Alexander. Ethnicity. Rare, and American Foreign Policy. Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1992. p. 52. 
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a widespread sympathy they elicited among other Americans 
because of the brutalities they had suffered, and from organized 
political activity by earlier immigrants. Other factors in the 
Jews' successful lobbying were an intelligentsia with access to 
policymakers and to the public and the support of wealthy 
Jewish leaders who had already established themselves in 
American society.106 
As the impact of the Jewish lobby's success became felt, the 
organization gained momentum and established a broader agenda. In the 
early 1900's, letters deluged the White House in protest to the continued 
brutality toward Jews in Russia. Ethno-religious leaders staged protests 
and led a march of over 50,000 people through the streets of New York 
City in 1905. In 1906, prominent Jewish lobbyist and banker Jacob Schiff 
organized a number of Jewish and other banking firms to block the 
extension of credit to Russia. Subsequently, the American Jewish 
Committee was formed, a lobby which attempted to sway policy 
regarding a commercial treaty of 1832, which empowered Russia to bar 
American Jews from entering the country. The American Jewish 
Committee showered Congress with demands for the abrogation of the 
treaty, which was terminated by President William H. Taft in December, 
1912.107 
So it happened that in the wake of World War One, the United States 
was responsive to and supportive of the plan for the establishment of a 
Jewish national home, as articulated by British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Balfour's Declaration, which "viewed with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best 
1 OR 
endeavors to fulfill the achievement of this objective." 
The World War Two years would render infamous the atrocities 
committed by the German Third Reich against the Jews as an ethnic 
group. And, unlike the previous holocausts, of Ukrainians by Stalin 
during his collectivization campaign, or of Armenians at the hands of the 
Turks , the Jewish holocaust received unprecedented publicity. American 
106Ibid.. p. 53. 
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leaders could not help but be moved by the tales of horror and injustice 
incurred by the Jews of Europe.. 
Although a Jewish Palestine was still viewed by the U.S. State 
Department at the end of 1946 largely as a British preserve, an approach 
which precluded the establishment of a Jewish state,109 the next year was 
spent in preparation for the presidential election, and President Truman 
was naturally influenced by the massive American Jewish political lobby 
which strongly advocated the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
American Jewish activists joined forces with their British contemporaries 
and Zionists of the world to lobby for the establishment of a national 
home for the Jewish people, which came into existence on May 14,1948. 
Meanwhile, with massive Jewish immigration, the United States was 
becoming the center of world Zionism. The U. S., who was at that time 
experiencing very poor relations with the Soviet Union, did announce de 
facto recognition of Israel immediately after Israel's proclamation of 
independence, with widespread popular support in the U.S. So began the 
long history of close relations and support for Israel by Washington. The 
American Jewish lobbyists have ensured the United States' continued 
support of Israel on many levels, including the passage of legislation 
favorable to Jewish concerns, most notably the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
of 1972-75. In this way the United States continues to have a profound 
impact on Russo-Israeli relations. The relationship has remained 
essentially positive throughout the duration of the Cold War, to the 
present day. 
1. Today's U.S. Foreign Policy 
While the face of international politics has changed drastically in recent 
years, the making of American foreign policy has been undergoing a more 
gradual but equally definite change over the past few decades. This has 
been as much in reaction to the changing world as it has been to internal 
domestic political change. 
109 Ganin, Zvi. Truman. Ampriran Tewry. and Israel. 1945-1Q4S New York- 
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Two important factors affect U.S. foreign policy today. First, from the 
1960's to the present, from Lyndon Johnson to Bill Clinton, several weak 
presidencies have precipitated a shift in power from the presidency to the 
Congress, which now bears an ever-greater responsibility for the 
formulation and administration of U.S. foreign policy. The administrations 
of Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and initially that of Richard Nixon are 
notable exceptions to this trend. Fortunately, the turnover of the U.S. 
Senate is relatively low, creating a stable body which is able to gain some 
level of expertise is these intricate issues, and carry out a coherent and 
consistent plan. Secondly, there is great uncertainty of who the new 
adversary is or will be. The United States must therefore be extremely 
cautious in constructing a foreign policy which will not be too rigid, but at 
the same time effective enough to achieve its goals.110 
The United States' program of aid to Russia is a good example of why 
this policy needs to be flexible, due to the uncertainty of Russia's future 
and the great instability there. Recent failures of peacekeeping missions, 
whether via the United Nations, NATO, unilaterally or bilaterally have 
raised serious questions about organizational coalition management. 
The situation in the Middle East is still unresolved; the threat in the 
Persian Gulf area is still uncertain. 
America's interest in the gulf remains appropriately 
unchanged with the end of the Cold War: guaranteeing the 
uninterrupted flow of oil to the world market at prices that do 
not damage the economies of the United States and its allies in 
the advanced industrialized world. What has changed is the 
perception of where the threats to that interest lie, and how the 
United States should respond.111 
With the end of the Cold War, some people suggest that Israel is no 
longer of such vital strategic value to the United States, due to the 
diminished threat from Russia and the cessation of the tendency to exert a 
dominating sphere of influence in the area. Yet Russia's own domestic 
political situation is currently extremely fragile and volatile, and one 
DAmato, Richard. (Chief Counsel to Senate Appropriations Committee) 
Lecture. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 10,1995. 
mGause HI, p. 58. 
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should therefore not make casual predictions about the potential for 
change. "All the vices of Communism, which used to be more or less 
camouflaged by the party's system of euphemisms and restrained by 
hierarchical discipline, are now unleashed in the atmosphere of total 
impunity."112 As the situation becomes more and more desperate, the 
government of Boris Yeltsin will become more unstable. And if a radical 
leader comes to power, not only will relations with Israel be in question, 
but Russia's entire political status quo may be in jeopardy. 
While it may be true that Russia no longer presents a threat to U.S. 
interests in the Middle East, the continuing unresolved conflicts between 
Israel and certain Arab countries, not to mention the ongoing conflicts 
among the Arab countries themselves, present a potentially dangerous 
uncertainty, one for which we ought to be prepared. 




Many different factors, both the domestic political changes occurring 
within Israel and Russia, plus the constantly changing dynamics of 
international politics were responsible for the rapprochement between 
Russia and Israel which began in the late 1980's and culminated in the mid 
1990's. A proposal that the rapprochement was initiated because of a 
unilateral Soviet policy change in the wake of perestroika would be 
partially correct, but far too simplistic. 
Timing is everything. Middle East politics, U.S. politics, the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe and the struggling Russian economy, these 
factors all played important roles in why the rapprochement occurred 
when it did. Had one of these elements been less favorable, the 
improvement in relations may have taken place many years from now- or 
not at all. 
The turmoil present in the Russian domestic political situation since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union required a re-evaluation of Soviet 
strategy, one that had already begun to change under Gorbachev's 
perestroika. This re-evaluation of interests, particularly interests in the 
Middle East, identified Israel as a country whose friendship with Russia 
could prove very beneficial to Russia. 
The terms Russia presented for the re-establishment of relations, 
Israel's actions to restore some semblance of autonomy and to work 
toward a peaceful solution with the Palestinians, were met by Israel's talks 
with the PLO and willingness to cooperate in this regard. The timing was 
just right in this respect as well, as the conservative Likud government in 
Israel had just been replaced by the more liberal Labor party, led by 
Yitzhak Rabin. The agreement signed in September, 1993, the Israeli- 
Palestinian Declaration of Principles, demonstrated Israel's earnest desire 
to come to a peaceful settlement with the Palestinians. Co-sponsored by 
Russia, this agreement cast a favorable light upon Russia in its continuing 
role as an international power and influential mediator. 
Change was possible in Russia due to changes in the bureaucracy, 
public opinion, and ideology, as reflected by the political rhetoric 
regarding Israel and Jews. 
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Although some politicians still in office remain communists but in 
name, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yeltsin's stormy presidency 
has created the opportunity for many rigid, old-school, anti-Israel 
communists to be replaced with more open-minded individuals who can 
readily accept new ideas. 
The trends in public opinion in Russia do not necessarily support the 
explanation why the rapprochement between Israel and the former Soviet 
Union occurred, but they are certainly reflective of it. Official anti- 
Semitism has been much lower in past years until just recently. Perhaps on 
the personal level the public has been affected by recent anti-Semitic 
campaigns, but it has not the legitimate foundation to cause any kind of 
change in national policy. If this trend continues, however, and 
individuals like Vladimir Zhirinovsky continue to gain support, some 
change may become imminent. 
Russia's and Israel's relations with the United States, Egypt, Syria, Iran, 
Iraq, the PLO and other Middle Eastern countries all had significant effects 
on the rapprochement. Public opinion in Russia regarding Arab Middle 
Eastern states became more balanced and objective; this was reflected in 
the status of Russia's new alliances. The United States encouraged a 
Russo-Israeli rapprochement,, and the issue of the emigration of former 
Soviet Jews became centerpiece to this question. 
The road to re-establishment of relations has been long and difficult. 
The issue of emigration from Russia to Israel has been both a cause and a 
reflection of the ups and downs in this relationship. With former Soviet 
Jews now making up approximately 10% of Israel's population, improved 
relations are more critical than ever, as issues of concern to both of these 
countries will certainly continue to arise. 
It is hoped that greater cooperation in the field of business will 
generate a positive economic impact back in Russia, whose economy is 
suffering badly, and can use all the infusions of cash, technology, and 
investments than it can get. Joint ventures in everything from agriculture 
to outer space are underway between Israel and Russia, which will also 
hopefully stimulate employment in the overburdened Israeli sector. 
Russia currently enjoys a healthy relationship with Israel. Russia's 
image has been enhanced in the West as a fair and open-minded state, a 
country willing to set the example as a peacemaker in the world arena. 
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Russia's strategic position has been also enhanced in the Middle East with 
a strong and stable ally such as Israel. 
Could the rapprochement have occurred without the collapse of the 
Soviet Union? Yes, but it is not very likely. Although Gorbachev's 
perestroika opened the door to Israel and initiated the first of the positive 
political rhetoric, it is very probable that the continued existence of the 
Soviet Union would have prolonged the competition for spheres of 
influence between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle 
East. Since Israel has historically been such a staunch ally of the United 
States, it would not have been easy for the Soviets to approach the Israelis 
while there was still any measure of mistrust or animosity between them 
and the U.S. 
History demonstrates how changes in the relations between 
superpowers can have broad impacts on other countries. With the end of 
the Cold War, Russia suddenly had numerous new options to pursue. One 
of these was Yeltsin's decision to continue Gorbachev's plan of a 
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